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RULES AGAINST RULIFICATION 
Michael Coenen*
Abstract: The Supreme Court often confronts the choice between bright-line rules and open-
ended standards—a point well understood by commentators and the Court itself.   Far less 
understood is a related choice that arises once the Court has opted for a standard over a rule: 
May lower courts develop subsidiary rules to facilitate their own application of the Supreme 
Court’s standard, or must they always apply that standard in its pure, un-“rulified” form?  In 
several recent cases, spanning a range of legal contexts, the Court has endorsed the latter 
option, fortifying its first-order standards with second-order “rules against rulification.”   
Rules against rulification are a curious breed:  They promote the use of standards, but only in a 
categorical, rule-like manner.  The existing literature on the rules-standards dilemma thus sheds 
only limited light on the special problems that anti-rulification rules present.  This Article 
addresses these problems head-on, disentangling the (often unintuitive) consequences that result 
from the Court’s adoption of anti-rulification rules, while also offering practical suggestions as 
to when and how these rules should be deployed.  Overall, the Article’s take is qualifiedly 
negative: Anti-rulification rules, while useful in some circumstances, carry the undesirable and 
often unnecessary consequence of cutting lower courts out of the lawmaking loop.  And that in 
turn impedes the Court’s own ability to refine and develop its standards over time.  The Court 
should therefore pronounce rules against rulification only sparingly, and lower courts should 
identify them only begrudgingly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court often faces a choice between bright-line rules and open-ended 
standards.  That is, with what degree of specificity should the Court enunciate controlling 
principles of doctrine?  The tradeoffs are familiar.  With rules, the Court can buy itself 
uniformity, predictability, and low decision costs, at the expense of rigidity, inflexibility, and 
arbitrary-seeming outcomes. With standards, it can buy itself nuance, flexibility, and case-
specific deliberation, at the expense of uncertainty, variability, and high decision costs.1  Every 
case that reaches the Court’s docket presents some version of this design dilemma, and every 
opinion the Court issues reflects some determination as to where on the rules-standard spectrum 
its holding ought to lie. 
 The choice between rules and standards sometimes accompanies a second choice, which 
arises once the Court has opted for a standard over a rule.  Having articulated a governing 
standard, should the Court permit future rule-like elaborations on the substance of the standard, 
or should it require that lower courts apply the standard in its pure, unadulterated form?  Put 
differently, should the Court adopt a permissive standard, whose application may be assisted by 
the development of ancillary rules, or a mandatory standard, fortified by a rule against 
rulification.   
 Florida v. Harris illustrates this choice.2  The case involved the Florida Supreme Court’s 
application of the Fourth Amendment probable cause test, which, as defined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, permits searches based on “a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”3  The Florida court in Harris had 
held that a police dog’s detection of drug odors did not create probable cause to search the 
defendant’s vehicle, reasoning that the dog lacked the requisite credentials to indicate a “fair 
probability” of contraband under Gates.  In so holding, the court identified several criteria for 
evaluating the drug detection credentials of canine cops:  Among other things, it held that the 
government bore the burden of adducing “the dog’s training and certification records, an 
explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification, field performance records 
                                                             
1
 See infra note ?. 
2
 133 S. Ct. 1050. 
3
 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  Rather than tether probable cause to the presence of precise, outcome-determinative 
criteria, the Court endorsed a “totality-of-the-circumstances” inquiry, governed by a “practical, common-sense 
decision whether . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place.”  Id.   
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(including any unverified alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of the 
officer handling the dog.”4  Applying this highly specific minimum-showing requirement, the 
state court went on to hold that the search lacked probable cause, because the government never 
produced the required records on behalf of the dog.  
 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  The lower court had erred, the Court 
explained, by “creat[ing] a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick 
off.”5  In this way, the state court had employed the “antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis,” not allowing evidentiary deficiencies as to a dog’s training credentials to “be 
compensated for . . . by a strong showing as to . . . other indicia of reliability.”6  The “inflexible 
checklist,” simply put, was not “the way to prove reliability.” The state court should have asked 
the simpler question of whether “all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens 
of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal 
contraband or evidence of a crime.”7 
 The Supreme Court’s disapproval of the lower court’s decision thus encompassed not just 
a substantive disagreement with the conclusion that the canine-initiated search lacked probable 
cause, but also a methodological objection to the manner in which the court had performed its 
analysis.  The state court had applied a rule where a standard was required.  Gates demanded a 
particularized, case-by-case inquiry of canine-based searches; it did not permit the promulgation 
of an across-the-board, outcome-determinative “checklist” approach for evaluating the drug 
detection credentials of police dogs.  Harris may thus be construed as adopting an anti-
rulification rule, making clear that the Gates standard was mandatory rather than permissive as 
applied to sniff-search probable cause review.  In other words, lower courts were precluded from 
building out the Gates standard by fashioning sub-rules that would objectify its operation in 
particular categories of Fourth Amendment cases. 
 Rules against rulification are a curious breed.  In one sense, they further many of the 
benefits associated with standards writ large.  They guard against overinclusive and 
underinclusive doctrinal formulations and thereby promote fairness on an individualized basis.  
They reduce the risk of legal obsolescence over time.  They encourage case-specific deliberation 
long associated with the common law method.  And so on.  At the same time, rules against 
rulification are themselves rules, which limit lower court involvement in the shaping of Supreme 
Court doctrine.  When the Supreme Court promulgates a permissive standard, it invites lower 
courts to adorn that standard with subsidiary rules; lower courts may (or may not) choose to fill 
in the relevant gaps with bright-line boundaries, safe harbor presumptions, categorical 
exceptions, multi-factor tests, and the like.8  In sharp contrast, mandatory standards produce 
methodological rigidity at the lower court level, prohibiting downstream elaboration of a 
standard’s open-ended terms except through narrow and case-specific holdings.  In other words, 
the Supreme Court enunciates a norm, the norm is a standard, and all that remains for lower 
courts to do is to apply the standard without further specification as to what the standard entails.  
                                                             
4
 Harris v. State, 71 So.3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2011).  
5
 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056. 
6
 Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 233). 
7
 Id. at 1058. 
8
 The mechanics of this process (sometimes termed the “rulification of standards”) are further described in Frederick 
Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2004). 
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 The primary goal of this Article is to sketch out some criteria for evaluating the use of 
rules against rulification and, accordingly, the choice between mandatory and permissive 
standards.  Having decided to offer the lower courts guidance in terms of a standard rather than a 
rule, when should the Court take the further step of expressly prohibiting the lower courts from 
rulifying the standard in future cases?  At first glance, this question might seem to answer itself:  
If the Supreme Court itself has opted for a standard over a rule, why would it ever wish for the 
lower courts to translate the standard into rules?  In fact, however, good reasons will often favor 
just such an approach.  In many circumstances, as this Article will show, the Court might 
sensibly choose to define a norm in standard-like terms while still permitting lower courts to 
flesh out some specifications of the standard in the form of general, bright-line rules. 
 By introducing the concept of anti-rulification rules and offering a preliminary appraisal 
of their advantages and disadvantages, this Article aims to inform at least three ongoing areas of 
scholarly inquiry.  The first involves the rules-standards problem itself.  From the legal realists 
on down,9 courts and commentators have scrutinized many aspects of the choice between rules 
and standards, focusing on their respective virtues and vices, their effects on individual conduct, 
their relationship to formalist and functionalist modes of judging, and so on.10  While not 
intervening directly in the longstanding rules-standards debate, this Article does shine some new 
light on it, by suggesting how choices between rules and standards at the Supreme Court level 
affect the development of the law within the lower courts that the Justices oversee.  In particular, 
the Article suggests that when standards are permissive rather than mandatory, proponents of 
rules should sometimes be willing to tolerate (if not endorse) the adoption of such standards at 
the Supreme Court level, because Supreme Court standards—unlike Supreme Court rules—leave 
room for lower courts to experiment with rules.  Put another way, a standard adopted at the 
Supreme Court level need not translate into totality-of-the-circumstances review at the lower 
court level in every case.  And articulation of a standard by the Supreme Court—if permissive 
rather than mandatory in nature—may facilitate the fashioning of a better set of rules.  
 The second area of relevant literature involves judicial minimalism.  A minimalist court, 
as Cass Sunstein has put it, “settles the case before it, but [] leaves many things undecided,” 
avoiding in the meantime “clear rules and final resolutions” regarding issues that might benefit 
from further contemplation among courts, other public officials, and private citizens.11  For this 
reason, Professor Sunstein and other commentators have drawn parallels between the debate over 
minimalism versus maximalism and the debate over rules versus standards:  Compared to 
standards, rules more severely constrain the resolution of future cases; consequently, minimalists 
champion standards over rules in enunciating controlling propositions of law.12  This Article, 
however, raises an important caveat regarding this jurisprudential stance.  It suggests that 
standards jibe with minimalism only when articulated in a way that permits the development of 
follow-on rules.  The Court does not further minimalist values when it foists a legal standard on 
all future courts for all time, categorically prohibiting these courts from developing rules to assist 
in their application of the standard.  Rather, the truly minimalist opinion merely adopts a 
standard for itself, leaving future courts free to decide whether the standard performs best in 
rulified, semi-rulified, or non-rulified form.  The key point is that the minimalist virtues of 
                                                             
9
 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115-20 (1922). 
10
 See sources cited in note ? supra. 
11
 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT ix (1999). 
12
 See sources cited infra note ?. 
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standards dissipate when rules against rulification enter the picture.  It is only with permissive 
standards that the Court can effectively “leaves things undecided.” 
 Finally, in describing and examining the Court’s many rules against rulification, I hope to 
contribute to an emerging area of scholarly interest and debate: the role of the Supreme Court in 
shaping and constraining the methodological choices of the courts within its purview.  The 
academic literature on this question has thus far focused on statutory interpretation, inquiring 
into the possibility, reality, and desirability of according binding effect to various methods of 
statutory interpretation.  Scholars in this line of work have asked, for instance, whether the Court 
does (or at least should) require future interpreters of a statute to employ textualism over 
purposivism, eschew legislative history, or otherwise constrain the methods by which judges find 
meaning in statutory text.13  While not asking these particular questions, the Article advances 
ideas that may inform and enrich our answers to them, by drawing attention to a set of doctrines 
through which the Court has unabashedly imposed methodological restraints on its subordinates.  
The Court’s rules against rulification, that is, may help us understand the relationship between 
methodology and precedent more generally.  At the least, they raise the question whether the 
Court’s willingness to impose methodological constraints on lower courts in applying doctrinal 
standards sanctioned by the Court itself can be reconciled with its current unwillingness to do the 
same when it comes to the interpretation of statutory commands. 
 The ensuing analysis proceeds in five Parts.  Part I offers a conceptual overview of anti-
rulification rules, explaining what they are and how they operate.  Part II catalogues examples of 
anti-rulification rules within several different areas of Supreme Court doctrine.  In domains 
ranging from the Fourth Amendment to the Takings Clause to intellectual property law to the 
law of remedies, the Court has established limitations on the extent to which lower courts may 
rulify substantive standards that the Court itself has laid down.  With these examples on the 
table, Part III turns to the question of why the Court creates rules against rulification and why it 
sometimes might wish to avoid doing so.  In particular, the analysis suggests that rules against 
rulification make sense when the Court deems the value of fit to be of paramount importance in 
applying law to fact.  That is, when the overarching priority of a doctrinal formulation is to 
minimize overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness, rules against rulification help to prevent 
lower courts from undermining this priority by displacing the fuzzy penumbrae of a norm with 
sharp and brittle edges.  As Part III notes, however, prohibiting downstream rulification of a 
standard presents problems of its own, which relate principally to the law’s development over 
time.  A major concern is that categorical bans on rulification foreclose valuable forms of 
experimentation, deliberation, dialogue, and transparency concerning the optimal formulation of 
a legal command.  Put more simply, rules against rulification threaten to decide too much too 
soon, thus undercutting the minimalist virtues that substantive standards would otherwise confer. 
 Part IV raises and address two follow-up questions regarding anti-rulification rules.  First, 
once the choice has been made to promulgate a rule against rulification, how should the Court go 
about effectuating the command?  Second, how can lower courts tell whether an anti-rulification 
rule binds them?  Here, I offer a variety of prescriptive suggestions. I posit, for instance, that the 
Court must take care to divorce its methodological justification for a rule against rulification 
from its substantive evaluation of the particular rulification that has come up for review.  I also 
suggest that lower courts should embrace a default presumption against the existence of rules 
against rulification, thereby demanding a clear statement by the Justices when they seek to 
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 See sources cited in note ? infra.  
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propound a mandatory standard.  But I also propose that when anti-rulification rules have been 
clearly articulated by the Supreme Court, lower courts may not dismiss them as non-binding 
dicta. 
 In Part V, I imagine variations on the theme of anti-rulification rules, speculating as to 
other doctrinal formulations the Supreme Court might employ in attempting to control the 
manner in which lower courts apply standards to individual cases.  I consider, for example, the 
possibility of “pro-rulification rules,” which expressly instruct the lower courts to rulify a 
standard in whatever ways they deem fit.  I also consider the possibility of “anti-rulification 
standards,” which, in contrast to true rules against rulification, would merely discourage (but not 
prohibit) the development of rules to assist in the application of Supreme Court standards.  
Finally, I imagine the possibility of “anti-publication rules,” which would move even further in 
the direction of anti-rulification rules, by prohibiting the development of any legal precedents at 
all regarding a standard’s application to individual cases. 
 The reader expecting a firm, generalized, and (dare I say) rule-like conclusion regarding 
rules against rulification will find no such thing in the analysis that follows.  The reason why is 
that rules against rulification admit of few easy conclusions; sometimes they should be used, and 
other times they should not; and the difficult challenge thus becomes trying to identify the 
considerations that weigh for and against their operation.  That I cannot definitively endorse or 
condemn such rules, however, does not mean that there remains nothing interesting to say about 
them.  This Article considers these matters, while taking care not to oversimplify the subject 
under investigation.  The most important point is that neither the Supreme Court nor the lower 
courts can deal effectively with rules against rulification unless they recognize their existence 
and appreciate their importance.  For this reason, the Article seeks to remove these rules from the 
shadows and bring them into the light. 
I. THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES  
A. Rules, Standards, and Specificity 
 What separates rules from standards?14  The distinction depends in large part on the 
variable of specificity.15  The paradigmatic “rule” falls toward the high end of the specificity 
spectrum; it ascribes definitive consequences to the satisfaction of precise and determinate 
criteria.16 “Must be at least 5-feet tall to ride,” for instance, leaves little room for interpretation: if 
you are at least 5-feet tall, you can go on the ride;17 if you are shorter than five feet, there is no 
                                                             
14
 For a small sampling of the voluminous literature on rules and standards, see, for example, Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989);Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); 
Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term–Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).  
15
 See, e.g., James J. Park, Rules, Principles and the Competition To Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
115, 130 (2012) (“[R]ules and standards are primarily distinguished by their level of specificity.  Rules are more 
specific about what they require while standards tend to be more general.”) 
16
 In the words of Professor Sullivan, “[a] legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a 
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.”  Sullivan, supra note ?, at 58. 
17
 Logically speaking, “must be at least 5-feet-tall to ride” establishes a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
ride-worthiness.  Literally read, that is, the rule would not necessarily preclude a ride administrator from prohibiting 
admission to a 6-foot-tall individual deemed otherwise unfit to ride.  I am assuming here, however, that the average 
reader of the sign would apply to it the more commonsensical understanding that it guarantees ridership to all 
individuals who are at least five feet tall.  
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use waiting in line. The paradigmatic standard, by contrast, leaves many application-related 
details unresolved.18  “Must be mature enough to ride,” for instance, offers only a hazy definition 
of eligible riders.  What does the rule mean by “mature”?  Who counts as “mature enough”?  
Many would-be riders cannot know in advance whether they will get to ride; they must await a 
final decisionmaker’s judgment in order to find out whether they may step aboard. 
 Extreme examples of rules and standards are easy to create, but what about intermediate 
cases?  How, for instance, should we classify the command: “Must be approximately five-feet 
tall (or taller) to ride.”  That is less specific than the five-foot rule, but more specific than the 
“mature enough” standard.  Into what category, then, should it fall?  One could ponder this 
question at length, but doing so would not yield much of a payoff.  “Rules” and “standards” are 
not Platonic essences; rather, they are man-made concepts that facilitate our analysis of complex, 
real-world phenomena.  And for that reason, we need not (and probably should not) bother to 
delineate a fixed point on the specificity spectrum that divides the realm of rules from the realm 
of standards;19 the categories simply approximate something that is very much a matter of 
degree.20 
B. The Rulification Process 
 With common law adjudication in motion, the initial pronouncement of a legal norm 
marks only the beginning of its development.  As cases begin to arise under the norm, courts 
must decide whether a particular set of facts satisfies its triggering criteria.  And by rendering 
such decisions—which carry precedential force—courts inevitably elaborate upon the content of 
the norm itself.  To be sure, the extent of elaboration depends on the initial specificity of the 
norm; for highly specific rules, such as the “at least five feet tall” requirement, repeated 
determinations as to whether individuals do or do not exceed the five-foot minimum are not 
likely to tell us a whole lot more about what the requirement itself entails.  For less specific 
standards, by contrast, common law adjudication stands ready to convert an open-ended 
                                                             
18
 Again, in Professor Sullivan’s words, “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse 
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation.”  Id. 
19
 See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2002 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1, 18 (“The ‘specificity-generality continuum’ may be treated, for simplification, as ‘a dichotomy between 
‘rules’ and ‘standards.’” (quoting Isaach Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 
3 J. LEGAL. STUD. 257, 258 (1974))). 
20
 In identifying the rules and standards that emerge from judge-made doctrine, we must also take care to distinguish 
between the “fact-specificity” of a Court’s analysis and the specificity of the guidance that the analysis produces.  
These two variables often work at cross-purposes: fact-specific reasoning yields generalized (standard-like) 
guidance, whereas generalized reasoning yields specific (and hence rule-like) guidance.  Suppose, for instance, that 
a court decides that a driver should be penalized because and only because she was exceeding a rate of 90 mph: 
Abstracting away all other facets of the driver’s driving, that is, the court treats the single fact of the driver’s 90-plus 
mph speed as reason enough to impose the penalty.  That is an affirmatively non-fact-specific analysis, but what 
emerges from it is the highly specific rule for future cases—namely, that driving in excess of 90 mph is categorically 
illegal.  If, by contrast, the Court had scrutinized multiple aspects of the particular driver’s conduct—including, but 
not, isolating the rate of her speed—its opinion would have yielded less specific guidance for future decision-makers 
to follow.  If no one feature of the driver’s driving compelled the Court’s conclusion, then all that can be said for the 
holding is that it seems to prohibit “unreasonable” driving, as judged by a comprehensive assessment of each 
driver’s conduct.  The relevant sense in which rules are more “specific” than standards, then, lies not in the degree to 
which application of a norm must engage with the specifics of each case’s facts, but rather in the degree to which the 
norm constrains its future appliers. 
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pronouncement into a far more specific patchwork of rules.  This is what I mean by the process 
of “rulification.”21 
 Return again to the alternative “mature enough to ride” requirement.  Pronounced in the 
abstract, the requirement offers little guidance as to whether a given individual is eligible to 
board the ride.  To be sure, some applications of the rule can be immediately predicted:  under 
virtually all plausible interpretations of the “mature enough” rule, a newborn baby probably 
cannot board the ride, whereas a mild-mannered middle-ager will pose no problem.  But harder 
cases will arise:  What about an 8-year-old?  A 10-year-old?  Someone who seems physically 
mature but not emotionally mature, or vice versa?  Adjudicators will confront these sorts of 
“boundary” cases and, by resolving them, offer important glosses on what the norm commands.  
Suppose, for instance, that one application of the standard denies eligibility to a 12-year-old, 
while another application grants eligibility to an otherwise similar 13-year-old.  With these 
applications in place—and exerting binding effect on future appliers of the standard—we may 
now render more reliable predictions regarding further applications of the standard.  We will 
know, for instance, that being a teenager counts as a factor in favor of ride-worthiness maturity, 
while being twelve or younger counts as a factor against.  A future case might also hold that 
anyone caught cutting in line in the theme park will be deemed too immature to satisfy the 
“mature enough” standard.  With that case decided, we know that line-cutters are per se 
ineligible for a ride—even if other facts might militate the other way.  As these holdings 
continue to accrete, the judicially developed contours of the “mature enough” standard will 
become more and more apparent.22  Eventually, anyone who digs into the relevant case law 
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 This discussion draws on the work of Professor Mark D. Rosen, who to my knowledge is the first commentator to 
describe the rulification process along these lines.  See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 
ST. LOUIS L.J. 691, 696 (2005) (noting that as standards are applied, they “almost always become[] increasingly rule-
like,” and that “[t]his occurs because cases involv[e] particular facts” and “[a]s the cases are decided they become 
showcases of what, as a concrete matter, the Legal Standard requires”); Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative 
Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 479, 495-96 (2000) (“As the Standard is applied over a series of cases, it almost always becomes increasingly 
rule-like. This occurs because cases, by nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As the cases are decided 
they become examples of what, as a concrete matter, the Standard means.”).  Professor Frederick Schauer has also 
written about the rulification phenomenon, although his focus is less on the sort of “natural” rulification process that 
results from the accretion of judicial precedents, and more on conscious decisions to inject rule-like language into 
the interstices that standards leave open.  See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of 
Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 805-06 (2005) (“Whether it be by importing rules from elsewhere, or 
imposing rules of some sort on their own otherwise unconstrained decision-making, or filling decisional voids with 
three- and four-part tests, interpreters and enforcers of standards have tried to convert those standards into rules to a 
surprising degree . . .”); Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 105 
(2012) (noting the “tendency over time for courts to replace doctrine articulated in the form of standards with 
doctrine articulated in the form of rules with exceptions”); see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis 
Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1904 (2008) (noting that “courts frequently 
engage in what Frederick Schauer has called the ‘rulification’ of standards, developing sub-principles that guide 
their application of standards.”).  It is these more conscious attempts at rulification that anti-rulification rules are 
most likely to prevent.  See Section I.C, infra. 
22
 As Professor Schauer has described the process: 
 
Interpretations continuously change the options available to subsequent interpreters, thus 
occasionally making quite precise clauses more open ended in practice but more often making 
even the most open ended clauses substantially less so. For example, given the almost infinite 
number of inequalities inherent in all legislation, the range of permissible applications of the equal 
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should be able to translate the initially articulated standard into a rule-like formulation.  And 
courts will have accomplished this result without ever having purported to amend or revise the 
standard itself.  It is simply through the process of applying the norm to case after case that 
courts nudge the norm up the specificity spectrum and thereby increase its rule-like character.  
This process of “rulifying” a standard is entirely proper; indeed, it is a natural and recurring 
consequence of issuing opinions with precedential effect. 
 The same cannot be said, however, when judges attempt the opposite feat—that is, by 
“standard-ifying” a previously adopted rule.  Suppose, for instance, that the “five-feet or taller” 
requirement is in effect; according to this rule, all persons who are at least five-feet tall are 
categorically eligible for the ride and all persons who fall below the threshold are categorically 
ineligible for the ride.  If a judge attempts to standard-ify this rule—by say, creating an exception 
for “approach five feet in height and are able to handle the demands of the ride”, or by clarifying 
that riders need only be “reasonably tall”—he or she can no longer claim fidelity to the operative 
law.23  Why?  Because by rendering the rule less specific than it previously was, the judge 
necessarily creates law that conflicts with the original rule’s doctrinal commands.  Rather than 
clear up an uncertainty that a norm leaves open, the standard-ification process introduces 
substantive outcomes that the norm had previously closed off.  The five-feet-tall-to-ride rule, for 
example, logically implies that no four-foot-eleven persons may board the ride; with the new, 
standard-ified command in place, however, some four-foot-eleven persons can make it on board.  
Rulifying standards adds paint to a blank canvass; standard-ifying rules removes paint that was 
already there. 
 The upshot of all this is that unlike the rulification of standards, the standard-ification of 
rules may be accomplished only by someone authorized to overrule the rule itself.24  Under our 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
protection clause, based on the text alone, is vast. As subsequent interpretations have limited the 
number of classifications that occasion meaningful equal protection scrutiny, however, the 
linguistic frame of the text alone has been substantially reduced in size, and therefore the size of 
the field within the frame has also been reduced. 
 
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 435 (1985). 
23
 This is not, to be clear, to argue that the “standard-ification” of rules cannot occur.  Indeed, the phenomenon 
occurs all the time, as several scholars have documented.  See, e.g., Schauer, supra note ?, at 804 (“From the 
American Legal Realists to the present, legal theorist[s] have devoted some attention to the ways in which 
seemin[g]ly crisp rules may have their edges rounded upon application, interpretation, or enforcement.”).  My point 
is merely that, within an operating legal hierarchy, only the highest-ranking court within the hierarchy may 
“standard-ify” the rules it has promulgated, whereas both that court and its lower-ranking subordinates may “rul-ify” 
its standards.  
24
 Few doctrinal commands are as absolute as the ones I have posited here.  Even norms that would strike most of us 
as “rules” sometimes contain a safety valve for cases where hard-and-fast adherence to the rule would otherwise 
yield absurd or unjust results.  Relatedly, some might argue that even the most absolute doctrinal commands remain 
subordinate to a global, superseding norm that always permits courts to soften the edges of a categorical rule when 
circumstances so warrant.  On this view, the standard-ification of a rule need not amount to a changing of the rule 
itself; rather, standard-ifying rules simply applies features of the doctrine already in place.  When accused of 
amending or repealing a categorical rule, that is, the standard-ifying judge might simply reply: “The law always 
permitted me to do this, because the law has never tolerated total absoluteness in its doctrinal commands.” 
But even if there exists a conception of the law under which courts can standard-ify rules without 
overruling prior precedents, the key point for our purposes is that this move will generally require a higher 
justificatory burden than a move in the inverse direction.  However we characterize the standard-ification of rules—
whether involving the alteration of existing precedent, the utilization of implicit safety valves built into a rule, the 
invocation of superseding principles of equity, and so forth—the process requires a judge to acknowledge that a 
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system of vertical stare decisis, this point matters a great deal.  It means that the doctrinal 
development of norms in the lower courts may move only in the direction of more specificity, 
not less.  A court might, for instance, permissibly declare that the “five-foot tall” rule requires 
measurements that include the height of a would-be rider’s shoes, it might require that the 
controlling measurement occur within 60 days of the ride, and so on.  But these holdings render 
the rule more specific, not less.  Any attempt, by contrast, to standard-ify the rule—by 
introducing, for example, the possibility of some eligible four-foot-eleven riders—can succeed 
only when the decisionmaker carries the further authority to change the rule.25  Under a strict 
stare decisis regime, then, highly specific rules are intrinsically invulnerable to standard-ification 
by any court subordinate to the rule’s promulgator, whereas not-so-specific standards can always 
be further rulified in these subordinate courts.  As a result, if the creator of a standard wants to 
prevent rulification, she must do something more than simply articulate the standard itself. 
C. Rules Against Rulification 
 What, then, might superior courts do to prevent rulification of their standards by 
subordinate tribunals?  The answer is to fortify the standard with a supplemental command 
regarding the method with which to apply it.  In the same way that a superior court demands 
adherence to the substantive standard it has adopted (e.g., “must be mature enough to ride”), it 
might also require applying that standard in a way that does not produce a body of ancillary 
rules.  Returning to our hypothetical, for instance, the creator of the “mature enough to ride” 
standard might stipulate that the maturity of a given rider must be evaluated on an individualized, 
case-by-case basis, without reliance on generalizations, presumptions, per se exemptions, and the 
like.  Higher courts could also strike down lower court precedents that have taken the doctrine 
too far up the specificity spectrum, identifying error in overly-broad reasoning that conveys too 
much information as to the content of the standard itself.  Any sort of command along these lines 
would qualify as a “rule against rulification”; the creator of the standard not only prescribes a 
substantive standard for future courts to apply, but it also takes the further step of instructing 
future courts not to rulify the standard when applying it to concrete cases. 
 At this point, an important question should emerge: Won’t anti-rulification efforts always 
prove futile in the end?  After all, as originally described, rulification occurs as a natural 
byproduct of courts deciding cases; the more cases the courts decide, the more data we acquire 
regarding the standard’s scope and substance.  The inevitable consequence of this process is an 
increasingly specific set of guidelines regarding when the standard will come out in one’s favor, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
doctrinal framework has become too constrictive and thus requires a reduction in constrictiveness.  Such express 
methodological tinkering need not (and often does not) occur when courts rulify standards; rulification, unlike 
standard-ification, arises as a mere byproduct of a court’s substantive reasoning—in general, adding a precedent 
regarding the application of law to fact provides more information (and hence increased specificity) regarding the 
law’s application in future cases.  The “natural” direction of doctrinal development, in other words, is in the 
direction of more and more specificity regarding the content of a legal norm.  The rulifier of standards comfortably 
drifts along with this current, whereas the standard-ifier of rules has to figure out a way to swim upstream. 
25
 One further clarification: nothing in the foregoing analysis should be read to suggest that lower courts cannot 
reduce the specificity of rules that they themselves have rendered.  Only its own internal rules of stare decisis stand 
in the way of subsequent lower court attempts to undo their own attempts at rulification.  Thus, for instance, if a 
lower court thinks better of its “measure with shoes” gloss on the “five feet tall” requirement, and decides instead to 
evaluate the propriety of measuring on a purely case-by-case basis, it would be free to overrule its prior precedent 
and reduce the overall specificity of its doctrinal commands.  What the lower court cannot do, however, is to 
displace a higher court rule with a standard of its own—it could not, for instance, install a “reasonably tall” 
requirement in the stead of the “five feet tall” requirement that vertical stare decisis commands it to accept. 
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and that information should eventually come to light regardless of whether courts articulate their 
holdings in terms of generalizations, presumptions, and other rule-like norms.  Insofar as the 
rulification process works this way, the only available mechanism to prevent rulification of a 
standard would be to prohibit courts from creating any precedents at all.  Absent this extreme 
solution,26 however, some amount of rulification will always occur.  The specificity of the norm 
will inevitably rise as the number of on-point judicial precedents increases.  And given that fact, 
it seems that in the long run, no rule against rulification will ever manage to achieve its 
underlying objective. 
 One may accept the premise of this objection without accepting the conclusion.  The key 
is to recognize that, even though the rulification of standards might inevitably occur as a result of 
common law adjudication, the pace at which it occurs can in fact be controlled.  Suppose that 
Suzie Q, a 13-year-old veteran of the fairground, wishes to experience the ride subject to our 
open-ended “mature enough” requirement.  The case comes before a judge, who decides that 
Suzie Q is in fact mature enough to ride the ride. What does the decision of In re Suzie Q tell us 
about the “mature-enough” standard?  At a minimum, it tells us that children identical to Suzie Q 
will satisfy the “mature enough” standard going forward.  But precisely how, and to what extent, 
must those children resemble Suzie Q?  The answer to that question depends on the reasoning of 
the Suzie Q decision itself.  If the judge issues an opinion declaring that Suzie Q was mature 
enough to ride the ride because and only because she was a teenager, that opinion will fill a huge 
swath of previously unoccupied doctrinal space:  Going forward, we would know that the 
“mature enough” requirement incorporates a strong presumption of ride-worthiness applicable to 
all children older than twelve.  If, by contrast, the judge issues an opinion declaring that Suzie 
Q’s maturity is evident from a holistic combination of her individual attributes—her age, her 
size, her demeanor, her past experience at theme parks, etc.—then the opinion will provide far 
less specification as to how future cases should be resolved.  We would know that children 
similar to Suzie Q have a good chance at satisfying the “mature enough” standard, but we could 
still only hazard guesses as to how similar to Suzie Q the kids must be.  These two contrasting 
decisions in the Suzie Q case—although they yield the same disposition—carry substantially 
different consequences for the rulification process; one moves the process along quite a bit, the 
other merely inches it forward. 
 In this respect, judges can indeed control the extent to which they rulify a standard in any 
given case, even if they cannot control the inevitable fact that, as they decide more cases, the 
substance of the standard will become increasingly rule-like.  And that in turn means that rules 
against rulification, while perhaps not capable of stopping the process outright, can at least 
decelerate it.  Bound by a rule against rulification, our lower court judge would be less inhibited 
from resolving In re Suzie Q according to categorical reasoning (i.e., Suzie Q gets to go on the 
ride because and only because she is a teenager) and more inclined to employ a mushier and 
more holistic analysis (i.e., Suzie Q gets to go on the ride because, all things considered, she 
seems like a pretty mature kid).  The rule against rulification would therefore tend to reduce the 
extent of future substantive guidance provided by the decision, thus producing a much slower 
rate of rulification over time.  Lower court precedents would still accumulate, and along with 
them, information regarding the standard’s applicability to a variety of cases.  But each 
decision’s contribution to the rulification process would be less substantial, meaning that 
complete specification of the standard would occur over a significantly longer time horizon.  For 
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 For an extended discussion of this possibility, see Section VI.C infra. 
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this reason, anti-rulification rules have profound practical effects.  At the very least, they ensure 
that standards remain static over the short-run, even if they are inevitably fated to evolve into 
rules in the long-run. 
D. Subtleties, Nuances, Etc. 
 Lurking beneath the seemingly simple terms of “rules,” “standards,” “rulification,” and 
“anti-rulification rules” are layers upon layers of complexity.  The discussion thus far has steered 
clear of complicating details, relying on artificial examples to help elucidate the core features of 
the concepts being introduced.   But before moving from tidy theory to messy reality, we should 
expose some of these simplifying assumptions, so as to reveal some difficulties that arise when 
attempting to classify and evaluate anti-rulification rules in the real world. 
 First, as we have already seen, the distinction between rules and standards is anything but 
clean.  The concepts merely approximate a property that is very much a matter of degree.  What 
is more, even when we replace the binary rules/standard frame with scalar comparisons of 
specificity, determining the extent to which one norm is more or less specific is not always a 
straightforward exercise either.27  But even though boundary cases will prove difficult, their 
existence does not a useless concept make, and there remain many scenarios in which the labels 
of “rule,” “standard,” “more specific,” and “less specific” can advance the analysis in a useful 
and understandable way. 
 Second, and related to the first point, I have sometimes spoken as if the “rulification” 
process involves the straightforward conversion of standards into rules.  But this too is an 
oversimplification; “rulification,” as I understand it, occurs any time a judicial decision 
materially increases the specificity of a controlling legal norm.  This can happen when 
paradigmatic standards become paradigmatic rules.  But it can also happen, for instance, when 
courts make specific rules even more specific, (E.g., “In applying the requirement that would-be 
riders’ must be at least five-feet tall, we will henceforth always measure the rider’s height 
without reference to the shoes she is wearing.”), or when making highly amorphous standards 
somewhat less so.  (E.g., “In applying the requirement that riders must be ‘mature enough’ to 
board the ride, we will henceforth measure maturity by reference to physical, rather than 
emotional, characteristics.”).  For simplicity’s sake, it may be helpful to view standards as the 
input of a rulification process and rules as the output, but nothing of significance turns on this 
particular point.  What matters most for our purposes is (a) that courts put “meat on the bone” of 
a legal directive when they apply that directive to future fact patterns; and (b) the Supreme Court 
sometimes seeks to discourage them from doing just that. 
 Third, as we will soon see, the Supreme Court does not always speak with clarity 
regarding the existence of a rule against rulification.  Sometimes, for instance, the Court may 
offer a lengthy justification for its own decision to favor a standard over a rule without indicating 
whether the same reasoning extends to lower court rulifications of the standard.  Sometimes, the 
Court may reject a particular rulification of a standard, without further indicating whether its 
rejection of that rulification would extend to alternative rulifications as well.  In these and other 
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 Try ranking the following three norms in terms of their specificity: (a) a categorical command with an amorphous 
exception built into it (“No one less than five-feet-tall may board the ride, except where justice demands”); (b) a 
non-categorical presumption with no exceptions attached (“We should in all cases disfavor letting people on rides 
who are less than five feet tall.”); or (c) an open-ended norm that categorically excludes consideration of certain 
criteria (“Only riders who are sufficiently mature may board the ride, provided that maturity is adjudged solely by 
reference to physical characteristics.”).  Different readers, I suspect, will come up with different answers. 
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cases, Supreme Court precedents leave anti-rulification rules debatably and not definitively 
present in the doctrine.  This is a problem that Part III considers in detail; for now, it suffices to 
note that observers will not always agree whether the Court has injected anti-rulification rules 
into its case law. 
 Finally, I have thus far spoken as if doctrine can be reliably trusted to constrain future 
decisionmaking.  But this too is an oversimplification.  Courts cannot always be trusted to follow 
the precedents to which they are bound.  Sometimes they forget about a controlling case; 
sometimes they misread an opinion; sometimes they willfully ignore the law; and so forth.  
Doctrine does not constrain as much as it purports to constrain; whatever influences it brings to 
bear must compete with a host of countervailing forces: human error, political pressure, policy 
preferences, and so forth.  Even if controlling Supreme Court precedent dictates that a lower 
court must apply a standard on a case-by-case basis, that command itself provides no guarantee 
that lower courts will always do so. 
 This same point, however, applies to all doctrinal scholarship: If outside forces motivate 
and explain judicial decisionmaking, the academic study of doctrine amounts to a colossal waste 
of time.  And, indeed, to the extent one truly and honestly believes that doctrine has no role to 
play in affecting the decisions judges render, the claim is unassailable.  But I don’t buy the 
premise: I think doctrine has some role to play in motivating judicial outcomes, and so I regard it 
as well worth studying as a force—though not the only force—underlying the resolution of 
cases.28  Thus, even though we cannot always trust in anti-rulification rules’ ability to bind where 
they purport to bind, we should not leap to the other extreme of insisting that they will never 
carry real-world effect. 
II. THE REALITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES  
 Having established the conceptual possibility of rules against rulification, I now turn to 
the question of their real-world existence.  The aim of this Part is twofold.  The first is to 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court does in fact issue rules against rulification.  The second is to 
show that the Court’s anti-rulification commands do not amount to meaningless blather.  That is, 
lower courts pay attention to anti-rulification rules when applying the substantive standards to 
which these rules attach.  That is not to say that lower courts always abide by rules against 
rulification; like any of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal commands, anti-rulification rules will 
sometimes find themselves subject to creative manipulation or benign neglect in the courts 
below.  But they are not paper tigers either, as lower courts have often pointed to these rules as a 
reason not to accept a rulification that litigants and/or trial court have invited them to adopt. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Commands 
Florida v. Harris provides a nice introductory example of an anti-rulification rule: There, 
the Court insisted that judges applying the probable cause test should reject “rigid rules, bright-
line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things considered 
approach.”29  Similar pronouncements have arisen in other areas of Fourth Amendment law.  For 
                                                             
28
 That is especially so, moreover, in the sorts of cases on which this article focuses: mine-run lower-court cases that 
often lack politically salient dimensions.  Cf. Michael Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial 
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 138-39 n.95 (2013) (suggesting that “legal doctrine matters little in landmark 
constitutional decisions,” and that “the more passionately judges care about the underlying policy issue, the less 
constraint they are likely to feel from the traditional legal sources” (emphasis added)). 
29
 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013).  Harris’s anti-rulification commands accord with other Supreme 
Court descriptions of the probable cause standard. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 235 (1983) 
(rejecting previous formulations of the probable-cause standard as a “complex superstructure of evidentiary and 
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instance, in evaluating the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent to a search, the Court has 
“eschewed bright-line rules” and “disavowed litmus-paper test[s],” favoring instead a 
“traditional contextual approach” that accommodates the “endless variations in the facts and 
circumstances” that individual cases present.30  It has done the same in defining circumstances 
under which citizens’ encounters with the police count as a Fourth Amendment “seizure.”31  
And, in asking whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search, the Court has recently 
called for a “finely tuned approach” that evaluates “each case of alleged exigency based on its 
own facts and circumstances.”32 
Other areas of criminal procedure law reveal anti-rulification rules at work.  For example, 
the Court’s suggestive identification jurisprudence—which asks whether police identification 
procedures violate a defendant’s right to due process—“requires courts to assess, on a case-by-
case basis, whether improper police conduct created a substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.”33  Similarly, when asking whether “extraordinary circumstances” justify the 
equitable tolling of postconviction filing deadlines, courts must apply the test “on a case-by-case 
basis,” so as to avoid creating “hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast 
adherence to more absolute legal rules.”34  In describing the “objective standard of 
reasonableness” that defines the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the 
Court has emphasized that “[s]pecific guidelines are not appropriate” and that “[n]o particular set 
of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions” that counsel might 
make.”35  And in articulating the boundaries of so-called “plain error” doctrine (governing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
analytical rules,” and instead urging lower courts to treat probable cause as a “fluid concept—turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal 
rules”); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise 
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the 
circumstances”). 
30
 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983)); Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (“Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the parties and determining 
that an investigatory pursuit is or is not necessarily a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our 
traditional contextual approach, and determine only that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did 
not amount to a seizure.”).  
31
 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (noting that the lower court “erred in adopting a per se rule” to 
determine whether a police encounter constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure, as the lower court should have 
“consider[ed] all the circumstances surrounding the encounter” in applying the applicable test). 
32
 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 n.3 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). 
33
 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012) (internal citations omitted); see also Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (holding that “each case must be considered on its own facts”). 
34
 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649-50 (2010) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 
238, 248 (1944)); see also id. at 669 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attributing to the majority the view that “all general 
rules are ipso facto incompatible with equity). 
35
 Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1406 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 
(1984)); see also id. at 1407 n.17 (“[T]he Strickland test of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the 
evidence.” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000))).  A related example comes from Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), which concerned an attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal.  Two lower 
courts had held that an attorney’s failure to file such a notice qualified as per se deficient under Strickland ,absent an 
explicit request from the defendant not to do so.  Id. at 478.  The Court rejected this formulation of test, concluding 
that it “failed to engage in the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry” that Strickland required.  Id.; see also 
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1119-20 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (holding that “the distinction 
between misrepresentations and omissions, on which the majority relies in classifying lower court precedent, implies 
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forfeiture of claims not raised at trial), the Court has warned of the dangers associated with “a 
per se approach to plain error review”—an approach that is flatly inconsistent with the “case-
specific and fact-intensive basis” on which plain error analysis is supposed to proceed.36 
The Court has also invoked anti-rulification rules in the civil context.  When it first set 
forth the three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,37 for instance, the Court made clear 
that the open-ended nature of the test reflected “the truism that due process, unlike some legal 
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances.”38  Following up on this point some 20 years later, the Court would invalidate a 
lower court attempt to embed an “absolute rule” within the Mathews framework, reasoning that 
the precedential support for such an approach was “far outweighed by the clarity of our 
precedents which emphasize the flexibility of due process as contrasted with the sweeping and 
categorical rule” the lower court had adopted.39  Or, as the Court has more recently put the point, 
“[b]ecause the requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections 
as the particular situation demands, we generally have declined to establish rigid rules and 
instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures.”40 
Consider also the Court’s recent description of the standard for issuing permanent 
injunctions in civil cases.  In eBay v. MercExchange, the Court defined the relevant “principles 
of equity” in terms of a “traditional four-factor test,” and then went on to fault both lower court 
decisions in the case for applying this test in an unduly rulified way.  The district court, that is, 
had erred by “appear[ing] to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief 
could not issue in a broad swath of cases.”41  The court of appeals had erred, meanwhile, by 
adopting a “general rule” that was too accepting of injunctive relief.  Though each court had 
reached a different result, both had committed the same methodological mistake: “[J]ust as the 
District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its 
categorical grant of such relief.”42  Both lower courts, in other words, had ignored the fact that 
the relevant doctrinal analysis depended on “traditional equitable principles,” which “do not 
permit such broad classifications.”43  Going forward, as Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
a categorical rule that is inconsistent with Strickland’s requirement of a case-by-case assessment of an attorney’s 
performance.”). 
36
 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142, 145-46 (2009).  More particularly, the anti-rulification rule here 
concerns the fourth prong of the plain-error test, which asks whether failure to address a forfeited error on appeal 
would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (internal quotations and 
alterations omitted).  It is this component of the plain error inquiry, the Court has made clear, that “is meant to be 
applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142.. 
37
 Under the Mathews test, Courts must weigh “[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.”  424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976). 
38
 Id. at 334 (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961)); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) (“The flexibility of our 
approach in due process cases is intended in part to allow room for other forms of dispute resolution; with respect to 
the individual interests at stake here, legislatures are to be allowed considerable leeway to formulate such processes 
without being forced to conform to a rigid constitutional code of procedural necessities.”). 
39
 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931 (1997). 
40
 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
41
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). 
42
 Id. at 394. 
43
 Id. at 393. 
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put the point, courts were to apply the “well-established[] four-factor test—without resort to 
categorical rules.”44 
Or, take the law of intellectual property.  In articulating the standard for determining 
whether a claimed invention is too “obvious” to qualify as patentable, the Court once faulted the 
Federal Circuit for “analyz[ing] the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with [the Patent 
Act] and our precedents.”45  These precedents, the Court emphasized, “set forth an expansive and 
flexible approach” to obviousness determinations, which should not be “transform[ed] . . . into a 
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry.”46  And the Court has sung a similar tune in 
defining the “fair use” defense to copyright infringement: Simply put, the analysis of fair-use 
claims is “not to be simplified with bright-line rules.”47   Congress, in short, had “eschewed a 
rigid, bright-line approach to fair use” when it codified the defense,48 meaning that any fair use 
claim “has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of 
the ends of the copyright law.”49 
Finally, consider the Court’s Takings Clause doctrine.  While the Court has characterized 
some types of government conduct as “per se takings,”50 it has emphasized that most areas of 
takings analysis must proceed in a manner that accounts for the “particular circumstances of each 
case.”51  In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, for instance, a lower court 
attempted to hold that recurrent, though temporary, floodings of land could never constitute a 
taking of property.52  But the Court rejected this “categorical bar” as inconsistent with the 
principle that “no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given 
government interference with property is a taking.”53  Much to the contrary, the Court held, 
“[f]looding cases, like other takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the particular 
circumstances of each case and not by resorting to blanket exclusionary rules.”54  The proper 
approach, in other words, called for “situation-specific factual inquiries.”55 
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 Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1044 
(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that in eBay, the Court “disapproved of the use of ‘categorical’ rules regarding irreparable 
harm in patent infringement cases”); Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay – Four Factor Fatigue or 
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 KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427-28 (2007). 
46
 Id. at 419. 
47
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
48
 Id. at 584. 
49
 Id. at 581. 
50
 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (physical takings); Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (regulatory measures that eliminate all economically 
beneficial uses of land).  
51
 United States v. Central Eureka Mining Company, 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); see also see also United States v. 
Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952) (“No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from 
noncompensable losses.”). Also within the takings context, the Court has arguably adopted an anti-rulification rule 
in connection with the Takings Clause’s public use requirement. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 
483 (2005) (“[O]ur public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas . . . .”); United States v. Toronto, 
Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402, (1949) (“Perhaps no warning has been more repeated than 
that the determination of value [for just-compensation purposes] cannot be reduced to inexorable rules.”). 
52
 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
53
 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012). 
54
 Id. at 521 (internal quotations omitted). 
55
 Id. at 518.  
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In sum, several different areas of Supreme Court doctrine, spanning both constitutional 
and nonconstitutional cases, reveal attempts by the Court to dictate not just the substance of a 
doctrinal standard, but also the method by which lower courts should apply the standard in future 
cases.  With that in mind, let’s now investigate whether the lower courts pay any attention to 
these commands. 
B. The Lower Courts’ Responses 
This Section highlights lower court cases that cite anti-rulification rules as reasons not to 
rulify a standard.  That is, in entertaining a potential rule-like application of a standard, the courts 
in these cases point back to the Supreme Court’s methodological commands as precluding such 
an approach.  These examples cannot definitely prove that anti-rulification rules carry real-world 
force; sometimes, for instance, lower courts might invoke the Court’s anti-rulification rules as 
post-hoc rationalizations for holdings that they are already inclined to issue.56  Nevertheless, the 
examples below at least help to indicate that anti-rulification rules place some weight on the 
methodological scale, rendering judges less inclined than otherwise to flesh out Supreme Court 
holdings in rule-like terms. 
Consider first the lower courts’ application of the Fourth Amendment probable cause 
standard.  In United States v. Brundidge,57 for instance, the Eleventh Circuit declined to 
invalidate a search based on an affidavit that lacked independent police corroboration.  The 
problem, in short, was that such a holding would effectively “requir[e] independent police 
corroboration as a per se rule in each and every case.”58  Such a rule was inappropriate, the court 
reasoned, not only because it lacked direct support in prior cases,59 but also, and more 
fundamentally, because the Supreme Court has “criticiz[ed] per se rules for the determination of 
probable cause.”60  Other lower courts have employed analogous reasoning to reject related 
rulifications of both the probable cause standard and other Supreme Court standards within 
Fourth Amendment law.61 
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 And sometimes, indeed, lower court dissenters have accused their colleagues of outright ignoring the Court’s anti-
rulification rules.  See, e.g., United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Gould, J., 
dissenting) (accusing the majority of “adopting a bright-line, ‘one size fits all’” plain error rule, in contravention of 
the Supreme Court’s anti-rulification commands). 
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 170 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1999).  
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 Id. at 1353. 
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 Id. (noting that “independent police corroboration has never been treated as a requirement in each and every 
case”). 
60
 Id. 
61
 Such claims involve, for instance, the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent to search, see, e.g., United States v. 
Gonzalez-Garcia, 708 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Gonzalez appears to argue that consent is coerced whenever 
police use an unwarned statement to obtain consent. But a categorical rule is inconsistent with the multi-factor, 
holistic approach to assessing voluntariness that this Court and the Supreme Court have endorsed”); United States v. 
Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir. 2010) (rejecting “a per se rule that medication (or intoxication) necessarily 
defeats an individual's capacity to consent,” on the ground that “per se rules are anathema to the Fourth 
Amendment”); United States v. Guimond, 116 F.3d 166, 170-171 (6th Cir. 1997) (highlighting “the Supreme Court's 
fourth attempt to point out that per se or bright-line rules are inconsistent with that court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence” before rejecting a proposed bright-line rule that would have automatically linked the presence of an 
illegal detention to a finding of involuntary consent), the presence of Fourth Amendment seizures, see, e.g., United 
States v. Broomfied, 201 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s “per se rule 
that authorities must notify bus passengers of the right to refuse consent before questioning those passengers and 
asking for consent to search luggage,” and holding instead that “such notification is a relevant fact to consider, [but] 
cannot be dispositive of the reasonableness inquiry”); United States v. Stephens, 232 F.3d 746, 747-48 (9th Cir. 
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Similar results appear in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, where the Court has 
warned against the use of “specific guidelines” to assess the reasonableness of an attorney’s 
conduct.62  In Harrington v. Gillis, for example, the Third Circuit reviewed a habeas petitioner’s 
ineffective-assistance claim, based on his defense attorney’s failure to appeal from a criminal 
conviction in Pennsylvania court.63  The state court had rejected this claim, invoking the rule that 
“before a court will find ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to file a direct appeal, 
Appellant must prove that he requested an appeal and that counsel disregarded this request.”64  
But the Third Circuit rejected the state court’s reasoning, holding that it contravened clearly 
established federal law.  The problem, again, was one of method:  The Supreme Court had 
“definitively rejected any per se rules for adjudicating claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel,”65 and the state court had attempted to apply a per se rule.  Put another way, the state 
court had treated one and only feature of the counsel’s conduct “as dispositive,” when it should 
have “consider[ed] all the circumstances” presented by the claim, thus “engag[ing] in the 
circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland.”66 
Procedural due process doctrine also reveals lower courts taking seriously the Supreme 
Court’s anti-rulification commands.  In McClure v. Biesenbach, for instance, the Fifth Circuit 
made short shrift of a claim that due process required predeprivation proceedings before a 
municipality abated a noise nuisance; such a “per se” claim wouldn’t work, the court explained, 
because “the mandates of due process are inherently flexible, and the courts must balance public 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2000) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting to denial of rehearing en banc) (admonishing the majority for adopting a per se 
rule contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent), and the presence of exigent circumstances justifying a 
warrantless search, see, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 488 Fed. Appx. 99, 103 (6th Cir. 2012) (“we have . . . 
established that the appropriate inquiry when evaluating exigent circumstances is to consider the totality of the 
circumstances”).  Relatedly, lower courts have also invoked the Court’s anti-rulification rules when evaluating due 
process claims arising from suggestive identification procedures.  See, e.g., Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25, 33–34 
(1st Cir. 2013) (endorsing a “totality of the circumstances” approach to determine the likelihood of misidentification 
(citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 724-25 (2012)),  
62
 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1407. 
63
 456 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2006). 
64
 Commonwealth v. Harmon, 738 A.2d 1023, 1024 (Pa. Super. 1999). 
65
 Harrington, 456 F.3d at 126.  But see United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) (endorsing 
“a narrow per se rule of ineffectiveness where a defendant is, unbeknownst to him, represented by someone who has 
not been admitted to any bar based on his “failure to ever meet the substantive requirements for the practice of law.” 
(quoting Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
66
 Harrington, 456 F.3d at 126 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 
478-79).  For additional examples of lower court adherence to anti-rulification rules in ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel cases, see Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 491-92 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding, in light of Pinholster’s anti-
rulification rule, that the defendant’s attorney did not act unreasonably simply by deciding not to investigate the 
defendant’s social history); State v. Starks, 833 N.W.2d 146, 164 (Wis. 2013) (acknowledging “that Strickland [does 
not] impose[] a constitutional duty upon counsel to investigate.”)); Commonwealth v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1, 26 (Pa. 
2012) (noting that “specific guidelines are not appropriate” for determining whether an “attorney’s representation 
amount to incompetence”).  Lower courts have expressed similar reluctance to rulify the Supreme Court’s standards 
governing requests for equitable tolling of filing deadlines. See, e.g., Palacios v. Stephens, 723 F.3d 600, 606 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (rejecting a proposed rulification of the equitable tolling standard on the ground that it would “be in 
tension with . . . the Supreme Court’s recent guidance that equitable tolling decisions ‘must be made on a case-by-
case basis’”); Pabon v. Mahoney, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011) (“There are no bright lines in determining 
whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given case. Rather, the particular circumstances of each petitioner must 
be taken into account.”). 
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and private interests.”67  More generally, courts have repeatedly incanted Mathews’s anti-
rulification rhetoric, emphasizing, for instance, that  “administrative proceedings . . . must be 
carefully assessed to determine what process is due given the specific circumstances involved,”68 
and that “[t]he precise procedural protections of due process vary, depending upon the 
circumstances, because due process is a flexible concept unrestricted by any bright-line rules.”69  
Consider too the way in which the Court’s eBay decision has affected subsequent lower-
court analyses of equitable remedies.  In Sanders v. Mountain America Federal Credit Union,70 
for example, the Tenth Circuit invalidated a “pleading rule” that a district court had applied to 
requests for injunctive relief under the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).  The rule, as the 
Tenth Circuit described it, “require[d] all consumers who seek to compel TILA rescission [of an 
unlawful loan] to plead their ability to repay the loan” as a precondition to the district court’s 
granting of such relief.71  But by issuing such a rule the district court had ignored the fact that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has rejected the application of categorical rules in injunction cases.”72  
eBay’s anti-rulification rule, in other words, had made clear that “categorical relief is beyond the 
reach of the courts’ equitable powers.”73  Rather than issue a rule applicable to all consumers in 
all TILA cases, the district court should have “weigh[ed] the case-specific equities in favor of 
both parties and the public interest.”74 
 Case law involving both the Patent Act’s “obviousness” standard and the Copyright Act’s 
fair-use defense also reveal lower court adherence to the Supreme Court’s anti-rulification rules.  
The Federal Circuit recently rejected an inventor’s claim of nonobviousness as premised on a 
“restrictive view” that would “present a rigid test” for obviousness, in violation of the Supreme 
Court’s command that “[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic 
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation.”75  Similarly, the Second Circuit 
has refused to adopt a rule under which a defendant’s bad-faith appropriation of copyright 
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 McClure v. Bisenbach, 355 Fed. Appx. 800, 806 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Lezcano-Bonilla v. Matos-
Rodriguez, No. 07-1453, 2010 WL 3372514, at *7 (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010) (“Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 
(1997), ‘rejected a categorical rule imposing constitutional due process requirements on suspensions without pay.’ 
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(quoting Torres–Rosado v. Rotger–Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
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 Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013); 
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 Steinert v. Winn Grp. Inc., 440 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006).  
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 689 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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 Id. at 1143. 
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 Id. at 1144 (quoting RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegel, 552 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
73
 Id. at 1143-44 
74
 Id iat 1144.  A related set of cases involves the so-called “presumption of irreparable harm” in patent and 
copyright cases, which, prior to eBay, many lower courts had routinely applied in connection with requests for 
injunctive relief.  Although “[t]he Supreme Court [in eBay] did not expressly address the presumption of irreparable 
harm,” Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2011), at least three courts of 
appeals have since jettisoned the presumption as inconsistent with eBay’s rule against rulification.  Id.; Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Google Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (characterizing the presumption as “clearly irreconcilable with 
the reasoning of the Court’s decision in eBay); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 76-78 (2d Cir. 2010). eBay, the 
Federal Circuit has explained, made clear that ‘broad classifications’ and ‘categorical rule[s]’ have no place in this 
inquiry,” meaning that plaintiffs “can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a request for a 
permanent injunction.”  Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1148-49.  Put another way, eBay “warned against reliance on 
presumptions or categorical rules,” meaning that “the propriety of injunctive relief” in patent and copyright cases 
“must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in accord with traditional equitable principles and without the aid of 
presumptions or a ‘thumb on the scale’ in favor of issuing such relief.”  Perfect 10, 653 F.3d at 979-81. 
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 Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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material would be “dispositive of a fair use defense,”76 citing the Supreme Court’s “warning 
against the application of ‘bright-line’ rules in fair use analysis.”77   
Finally, in Quebedeaux v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims confronted a takings 
claim arising from government-induced flooding of private land.78  In Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission, recall, the Court had refused to hold that temporary floodings of land fell 
categorically beyond the scope of the Takings Clause, holding instead that the takings analysis 
required “reference to the particular circumstances of each case.”79  Quebedeaux, by contrast, 
raised the question of how often such floodings needed to occur in order to implicate just-
compensation requirements.   The Government had asked the lower court to adopt a “bright-line 
rule” according to which “a single flooding event may not give rise to a takings,” but the court 
rejected this approach as inconsistent with the “multi-factored, factually-intensive nature of the 
takings analysis.”80  Instead, the court held, the inquiry “require[d] an examination of multiple 
factors, certainly beyond whether actual flooding has occurred once, twice, or even a dozen 
times.”81 
These examples highlight the breadth of anti-rulification rules.  In none of these cases did 
lower courts reject rulifications identical to ones that the Supreme Court had previously rejected; 
much to the contrary, they rejected rulifications that the Court had never before considered.  And 
they did so because they read the applicable Supreme Court precedents to establish not just a 
substantive prohibition on one particular rulification, but also a methodological prohibition on 
any and all attempts to make a standard a rule.   
C. The Alternative Approach 
 By now, the reader may be thinking: “Wait a minute! These examples stand for only the 
utterly unremarkable proposition that the Supreme Court sometimes adopts standards.  That’s 
hardly worth writing home about, much less in law-review-article form.”  But the rejoinder to 
that argument has already been advanced: as Part I made clear, a standard accompanied by an 
anti-rulification rule (what I have called a “mandatory standard”) is not the same thing as a 
                                                             
76
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 Id.; see also Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 n.6 (9th Cir. 1997) 
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recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”). For examples from the patent law context, see, e.g., Innogenetics, 
N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories, 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 n.3 (Fed Cir. 2008) (“We are mindful that in KSR, the Supreme 
Court made clear that a finding of teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine is not a ‘rigid rule that limits the 
obviousness inquiry.’”) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)); Rentrop v. Spectranetics 
Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that the lower court’s jury instructions did not violate the 
Supreme Court’s methodological instructions regarding the TSM principle because the court described the principle 
in “unrigid terms”). 
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 112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013). 
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 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012). 
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 Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. at 324. 
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 Id. at 324. 
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standard standing alone (what I have called a “permissive standard”).  I have already offered 
conceptual support for that point, but let me briefly hammer it home with a few concrete 
examples of permissive standards at work. 
 One permissive standard resides within Miranda doctrine.  Though the Miranda warning 
itself reflects a bright-line rule, courts must still determine when such warnings are necessary.  
And here the Supreme Court’s guidance has taken on a more standard-like character.  
Specifically, the Court has explained that Miranda applies once an interaction between law 
enforcement and an individual takes the form of a “custodial interrogation.”82  What counts as a 
custodial interrogation?  While the Court has offered some guidance on this point, it has largely 
delegated the development of governing law to the lower courts.83  This move, in turn, has led 
some courts to rulify important aspects of their doctrines concerning the scope of custodial 
interrogations.  The Third Circuit, for instance, has stipulated that the routine questioning of 
immigrants at border checkpoints qualifies as per se noncustodial for Miranda purposes.84  
Relatedly, several circuits have ruled that valid Terry stops never give rise to custodial 
circumstances.85  Until recently, the Sixth Circuit had applied a “bright-line test” to cases 
involving in-prison interrogations, according to which Miranda warnings “must be given when 
an inmate is isolated from the general prison population and interrogated about conduct outside 
of the prison.”86  And the Court itself has deemed questioning pursuant to a “routine traffic stop” 
to be noncustodial.87  These rulifications of Miranda’s definition of “custody” remain good law 
today, notwithstanding the fact that Miranda originally defined “custody” by reference to a 
standard rather than a rule.  
 A second example involves the identification of circumstances triggering application of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  In Massiah v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
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 Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 425 (1984). 
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 On one point, the Court has been clear: the determination must be based on the “objective circumstances of the 
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being 
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 See, e.g., United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, Terry stops do not 
implicate the requirements of Miranda. . . .”).  
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 Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813, 822 (6th Cir. 2010).  The test was recently rejected by the Supreme Court, though 
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between custodial and noncustodial interrogations.  Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012).  To be sure, the Court 
did suggest in Howes that “the determination of custody should focus on all of the features of the interrogation.”  Id.. 
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to create a custodial situation for  Miranda purposes.”).  Thus, I am inclined to read the case as setting forth only the 
relatively narrow principle that a per se custody rule is inappropriate as applied to prison interrogations, while 
leaving open the possibility that other per se rules (either for or against Miranda warning) make sense with respect 
to other types of “custody” claims. 
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 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984).   
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the post-indictment right-to-counsel covered not only overt interrogations by known government 
officers, but also covert investigations conducted by “government agents.”88  Yet the Court has 
offered little guidance as to who counts as a “government agent”89—what to do, for instance, 
about government informants?—and the lower courts have hazarded different means of 
answering the question for themselves.  Some circuits have applied a “bright-line rule,” under 
which an individual becomes a “government agent” only when “instructed by the police to get 
information about the particular defendant.”90  Other circuits, by contrast, utilize a standard-
based approach, identifying Massiah-worthy government agents by reference to the “facts and 
circumstances” of each case.91  Thus, by allowing lower courts to choose between rules and 
standards to facilitate their application of the “government agent” test, Massiah appears to have 
left a permissive standard in its wake—one as to which further rulification is neither required nor 
prohibited. 
 One further example comes from administrative law.  In United States v. Mead Corp., the 
Supreme Court expounded on its holding in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense 
Council, which set forth the basic framework for reviewing agencies’ interpretations of their 
enabling statutes.92  Specifically, Mead held that Chevron deference applies only when an 
agency has offered its interpretation when exercising validly delegated powers to act with “the 
force of law”; when, in contrast, the agency does not so act, courts must apply the somewhat less 
deferential (and more open-ended) framework of Skidmore v. Swift Co.  This distinction—
between actions that do and do not “carry the force of law”—drew immediate criticism from 
Justice Scalia, who, dissenting in Mead, attacked the standard as hopelessly vague.93  In a 
subsequent analysis of the decision, however, Professor Thomas Merrill argued persuasively that 
the lack of any clarity in Mead’s “force-of-law” was hardly a harbinger of doctrinal doom.  In his 
view, “nothing the Court did or said [in Mead] precludes future decisions that brush away the 
fuzziness in the majority’s exposition, leaving us with a clear and defensible meta-rule” for 
determining when Chevron applies.94  Put another way, as substantively vague as the “force-of-
law” requirement might seem to have been, the Court did not attach to it any anti-rulification 
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rules.  And so Justice Scalia’s concerns about doctrinal vagueness may well prove misbegotten 
as courts—including the Supreme Court—create sharp-edged rulifications of Mead over time.  
 The like locus of subsequent rulification, in Professor Merrill’s view, was the Supreme 
Court itself, rather than in the circuit courts tasked with applying the “meta-standard” of Mead.95  
But there is no reason why lower courts cannot start “brush[ing] away the fuzziness” for 
themselves while awaiting further guidance from the Court.  They might, for instance, hold that 
some forms of agency guidance (such as interpretive rules passed pursuant to notice-and-
comment procedures) are presumptively entitled to Chevron deference,96 whereas other forms 
(such as agency positions set forth in amicus briefs) are presumptively entitled to no such 
deference.97  Building on a suggestion offered by Mead itself,98 lower courts might hold that 
properly enacted legislative rules, having undergone notice-and-comment procedures, 
automatically trigger Chevron deference—thus establishing a safe harbor for agencies wanting to 
ensure deferential review of the interpretations they have propounded.99  None of this is to say 
that lower courts have no right to express confusion and frustration as to precisely what Mead 
and its progeny have instructed them to do.100  Nevertheless, they remain free to mitigate the 
confusion by rulfiying the “force of law” criterion on their own.101  That option would not have 
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been available to them if Mead had stipulated that downstream appliers of the “force of law” test 
must issue holdings on a “case-by-case” basis, only by reference to the “totality of the 
circumstances.”102  But Mead said nothing of the sort; it simply adopted an open-ended standard 
without placing limits on lower-courts’ ability to specify the content of that standard over time. 
III. THE LIMITED VALUE OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES 
 Thus far, this Article has established that standards laid down by the Supreme Court may 
operate in either of two ways.  If such standards are accompanied by rules against rulification, 
then lower courts may not develop specific rules concerning the standard’s application.  But if 
they are not accompanied by rules against rulification, then lower courts may freely choose to 
rulify or not to rulify as they best see fit.  With this descriptive picture drawn, the Article now 
turns to a normative appraisal.  What is the value of anti-rulification rules?  What respective 
costs and benefits do they generate?  When should courts use them, and when should they not?103 
At an intuitive level, the value of anti-rulification rules seems clear:  Once the Court has 
opted for a standard over a rule, an anti-rulification rule ensures allegiance to that choice.  We 
have already seen that the standard-like nature of a legal norm does not in and of itself prohibit 
further specification (and, thus, rulification) by lower ranking actors. A standard-like norm is an 
unelaborated norm; lower courts can and do flesh out the meaning of that norm in concrete and 
particular terms.  To the extent, then, that the Supreme Court sees virtue in a standard-dependent 
method of applying law to fact, a rule against rulification imposes the additional constraint 
needed to prohibit lower court departures from that choice. 
To see the point more clearly, consider the tradeoff between the substantive value of fit, 
on the one hand, and the procedural values of predictability, uniformity, and low decision costs, 
on the other.  The great virtue of standards—and the corresponding vice of rules—relates to the 
minimization of over- and under-inclusiveness problems.  Rules are the product of broad 
brushes; standards the fine-tipped pen.  Thus, standards are less likely than rules to yield 
individual outcomes that seem obtuse, unfair, or otherwise contrary to the “spirit” of the 
doctrinal inquiry.  But that benefit comes at a price: all else equal, applying a rule to the facts of 
a case decreases the workload of judges and litigants who engage in the task.  It requires little 
effort—and engenders minimal uncertainty—to determine whether an individual is or is not 
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taller than five feet.  By contrast, determining whether she is “mature enough” to board a ride 
entails a more difficult, more variable, and less predictable task. 
When a Court opts for a standard over a rule, it will have implicitly decided that, given 
the nature of the particular doctrinal inquiry at issue, the fit-related benefits of the standard are 
significant enough to outweigh the uniformity- and predictability-related benefits of a rule.  Put 
another way, the adoption of a standard signals an attitude from the Court that, whatever benefits 
a rule-like formulation might have offered along the lines of certainty, simplicity, and reduced 
decision costs, these pluses are outweighed by the fit-related  benefits that a standard confers.104  
But where the need to minimize over- and underinclusiveness is especially significant, the Court 
might conclude that downstream rulification of the standard would eradicate the very same 
benefits that initially warranted its adoption.  When the Court adopts a rule against rulification, it 
is effectively saying: “Look.  We think that considerations of fit and fairness take on paramount 
importance within this area of doctrine.  Therefore, in addition to opting for a standard over a 
rule, we are making clear that the methodological question is not open for relitigation in future 
cases.  You may be tempted to ease decisional burdens on yourself by rulifying the standard we 
have enunciated—but, if you did that, you would create the very same problems that compelled 
us to adopt the standard in the first place.  Therefore, you must apply this standard on a case-by-
case basis, without any reliance on ancillary rules.” 
 Under many circumstances, however, the proponent of a legal standard might reasonably 
decide not to adopt an anti-rulification rule.  And the remainder of this Part sets out to identify 
those sorts of circumstances in detail.  When, in other words, might the Court wish to implement 
a standard on the one hand, while still leaving open pathways for its eventual conversion into a 
patchwork of rules?  Tempting as it may be to suppose that the desirability of an anti-rulification 
rule always follows from the desirability of a standard itself—to suppose, in other words, that 
any time the Court opts for a standard over a rule, it should naturally want to fortify the standard 
against rulification in subsequent cases—the proposition turns out not to be true, or so I will 
argue in this Part.  There are in fact several reasons why a Court might wish to withhold anti-
rulification rules from even its most standard-like pronouncements.  The remainder of this Part 
takes on the task of identifying when this might be so. 
A. Experimentation 
A primary downside to anti-rulification rules relates to the lower courts’ role in 
developing Supreme Court doctrine.  These courts, unlike the Supreme Court, are categorically 
bound by Supreme Court precedents; according to well established principles of vertical stare 
decisis, they cannot simply set aside Supreme Court rulings that they regard as counterproductive 
or unwise.  Even faced with such strict precedential constraints, however, lower courts make 
their own independent contributions to the Supreme Court’s work.  Lower courts apply existing 
Supreme Court law to new fact patterns, and in so doing provide a substantial information base 
for the Court to draw on when considering further changes to the law.  By resolving the lion’s 
share of cases that arise under the Supreme Court’s precedents, lower courts attempt to make 
sense of these precedents in innumerable ways.  When the time later comes for the Court itself to 
update these precedents, the lower courts’ body of work can valuably inform the Court’s 
decision of which way to go.  
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Given this fact, the Court should avoid anti-rulification rules when it faces uncertainty as 
to whether a rule-like or standard-like pronouncement would better serve an area of doctrine.  
When this is so, the Court might benefit from freeing up the lower courts to experiment with 
both rules and standards in applying the permissive standard it has tentatively adopted.  The 
increased methodological freedom afforded the lower courts would then benefit the Court’s 
ultimate resolution of the rules/standard question for itself.  For example, the Court might 
become more inclined to replace the (permissive) standard with a rule after observing that all of 
the lower courts have immediately undertaken efforts to rulify the interim standard.  Or it might 
be inclined to make the standard mandatory after encountering dicta in a lower court opinion that 
persuasively explains why rulification of the standard would be counterproductive.  Or, if the 
lower courts apply divergent approaches (with some preserving the standard in its original form 
and with others converting the standard into a system of rules), the Court might base its ultimate 
decision on a sort of comparative assessment of how the norm has fared in rulifying and non-
rulifying jurisdictions. 
What is more, due recognition for the benefits of lower-court experimentation might also 
lead the Court to adopt a permissive standard even when it knows that rules should ultimately 
control the relevant field of law.  This is because lower-court experimentation might usefully 
assist the Court in selecting the appropriate formulation of the rule (or rules) that will one day 
prevail.  The Court may be interested to know, in other words, how “rulifying” jurisdictions go 
about specifying the content of the open-ended standard it has provisionally articulated, so that 
on a future occasion, it may consider between and among the lower courts’ different rulification 
strategies in ultimately settling on its own rule-like articulation of the norm.  To take a simple 
example, holding that a driver broke the law because he drove “unreasonably” settles far less law 
than holding that the driver broke the law because (and only because) his speed exceeded 65 
miles per hour. With the first holding on the books, lower courts would have to grapple with the 
meaning of the Court’s “reasonableness” requirement.  They will consider difficult cases at the 
margins of reasonable driving, and in so doing, identify a more specific set of conditions under 
which reasonableness can and cannot be shown.  (For example, the lower courts might hold that 
driving under the influence is always unreasonable, that driving while talking on the cellphone is 
always unreasonable, except when the phone call involves an emergency, and so on.)  
Eventually, these courts’ work could provide the basis for better-informed, down-the-road 
specification by the Court itself. 
There is a close parallel here to the well-accepted practice by which the Court lets 
unsettled legal questions “percolate” in the lower courts below before granting certiorari to 
resolve the questions for itself.  In many instances, the Court lets lower courts process a difficult 
legal problem before attempting to impose a single solution on the nation as a whole.  Indeed, the 
Justices themselves have openly stated that many denials of certiorari rest on this ground.105  But 
percolation might still remain desirable even after the Court has granted certiorari in a given case 
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and decided it on the merits.  Some aspects of a legal problem may be ripe for definitive 
resolution, even though others are not.  And for those aspects of the problem warranting further 
percolation, the Court can activate the percolation process through the provisional selection of a 
standard over a rule. 
When utilizing standards to transform lower courts into laboratories, the Court should not 
pair those standards with rules against rulification.  Lower courts cannot experiment with 
different rule-like approaches to a problem if the Supreme Court has prohibited rulification 
altogether.  To return to the example of the unreasonable driver, if the presence of bad motoring 
must always be adjudged by reference to the “totality of circumstances,” without the assistance 
of rule-like specifications of the reasonableness requirement, then lower courts’ application of 
the standard will yield less valuable information for the Court to draw upon in case it wants to 
replace the standard with a set of hard-and-fast rules.  The rule against rulification, in other 
words, freezes future law development in the lower courts, thus depriving the Court of useful 
data points regarding potential formulations of a rule, arguments for and against those 
formulations, the behavioral effects of those formulations within the jurisdictions that employ 
them, and so on.  That is not to say that the absence of lower court data precludes the Court from 
replacing a mandatory standard with a rule; doctrinally speaking, the Court may always choose 
to ignore its own previous anti-rulification rule and specify the standard however it pleases.  But 
if the only lower court precedents on the books are ones that apply the standard in a holistic, 
highly standard-based fashion, the Court’s own later reshaping of the standard must essentially 
start from scratch.  
B. Downward Delegation 
In evaluating the desirability of an anti-rulification rule, courts must also consider its 
delegating effects.  Standards, unlike rules, carry the consequence of devolving decisionmaking 
downward.  Rather than specify what an operative norm does and does not permit, the enactor of 
a legal standard leaves such matters for lower-ranking actors to decide—via the repeated 
resolution of cases arising under the standard’s open-ended terms.  Thus, as other commentators 
have noted, the decision to adopt a standard is, in effect, a decision to delegate downward, 
vesting lower-ranking actors with the ultimate authority to dictate results in a wide range of 
cases.  Justice Scalia himself has noted this point, observing that “when we decide a case on the 
basis of what we have come to call the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test, it is not we who will 
be ‘closing in on the law’ in the foreseeable future, but rather thirteen different courts of 
appeals—or, if it is a federal issue that can arise in state court litigation as well, thirteen different 
courts of appeals and fifty state supreme courts.”106  
Standards thus delegate authority downward.  The more subtle point is that the 
destination of the delegation depends on whether the Court supplements its newly declared 
standard with an anti-rulification rule.  Permissive standards achieve the result that Justice Scalia 
predicts; they vest lawmaking authority in judicial actors at the intermediate court level.  
Mandatory standards, by contrast, will push the delegation all the way down to the bottom of the 
judicial hierarchy, largely bypassing the intermediate courts on the way down. 
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Recall that only permissive standards empower intermediate-level courts (such as the 
thirteen circuit courts or the fifty state supreme courts) to impose rules on the lower courts they 
oversee; mandatory standards, by contrast, prohibit the intermediate courts from doing much 
more than affirming or reversing each trial court decision on the basis of its own unique record. 
Anti-rulification rules, in other words, substantially limit the amount of precedential guidance 
that intermediate-level courts can provide to the courts within their purview, thus giving bottom-
level courts (i.e., federal district courts and state trial courts) freer rein to apply Supreme Court 
standards according to their own best judgments.  To be sure, intermediate courts can, do, and 
should continue to reverse lower-level decisions that in their view misapply the governing 
standards.  But with the pronouncement of an anti-rulification rule comes the crucial added 
condition that such reversals may not be accompanied by opinions going far beyond the facts of 
the case.  The precedential sweep of these intermediate court rulings will therefore be narrow.  
And with intermediate courts constrained in their ability to direct the efforts of their subordinate 
actors, the subordinate actors necessarily acquire increased control over the standard’s 
implementation. 
Related to the de facto delegation of authority to lower courts effected by mandatory 
standard is another recurring feature of Supreme Court doctrine: the combination of anti-
rulification rules with deferential standards of appellate review.107  The latter, like the former, 
prevents intermediate-level courts from circumscribing trial court discretion in the application of 
an open-ended legal norm.  Deferential review accomplishes this result in a retrospective 
manner; it limits the extent to which reviewing courts can upset lower court judgments that have 
already been rendered.  Rules against rulification accomplish the result prospectively; they limit 
the extent to which reviewing courts can constrain trial courts’ application of a standard by 
imposing rules for future cases.  Mandatory standards thus prevent reviewing courts from 
achieving in an ex ante fashion the same sorts of incursions on trial-court autonomy that 
deferential review standards aim to discourage ex post.  
There remains a final difference between mandatory standards and permissive standards 
in terms of their delegation-related effects.  Mandatory standards, as we have seen, delegate 
decisional authority all the way to the bottom of the legal hierarchy.  Permissive standards, by 
contrast, delegate decisional authority to intermediate-level courts.  But notice that only 
permissive standards permit the delegee to redelegate.  From the Court’s refusal to adopt an anti-
rulification rule, it does not follow that an intermediate court must issue rules that constrain the 
trial courts’ application of the standard.  The intermediate court might instead decide that the 
standard makes sense as articulated by the Supreme Court, and that no further rulification is 
necessary.  Having so decided, the intermediate court would effectively delegate its own 
decisional authority down to the courts below it: rather than choose to provide further guidance 
to the lower courts in the form of rule-like specifications of a standard, it would allow the lower 
courts to take up the laboring oar for themselves. Thus, while I earlier noted that permissive 
standards transmit decisional authority to intermediate-level courts, it is perhaps more accurate to 
say that permissive standards leave open the ultimate question of where in the judicial hierarchy 
such decisional authority will vest.  Mandatory standards, by contrast, cut the intermediate courts 
out of the lawmaking loop. 
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C. Deliberation 
One of the oft-cited benefits of standards over rules is that standards (unlike rules) 
demand serious and continuous judicial engagement with the law.108  From this perspective, the 
mechanistic nature of rule-application counts as a minus rather than a plus.  The applier of a rule 
need only determine whether its triggering conditions are present (e.g., the driver did or did not 
exceed 65 mph) and resolve the case accordingly (e.g., the driver did or did not break the law).  
The applier of a standard, by contrast, has to wade deeply into the underlying dispute (e.g., what 
is it about this driver’s conduct that makes us think it was reasonable or unreasonable?).  This 
sort of engagement can benefit both the court and its audience in a variety of ways.  Among 
other things, it works against calcification and obsolescence in the face of changing factual 
circumstances, it can improve judges’ understanding of a recurring doctrinal problem, and it can 
promote useful debate and dialogue regarding the purposes, scope, and soundness of the standard 
itself.  Courts, in short, are more likely to explore and explain what the law is about when 
applying standards as opposed to rules, and these explorations and explanations can benefit the 
substance of the law itself. 
How do deliberation values affect the choice between mandatory and permissive 
standards?  On the one hand, anti-rulification rules safeguard deliberation values by stultifying a 
standard’s gradual evolution into a rule.  Lower court judges cannot specify the substance of a 
mandatory standard in crisp, generally-applicable terms, which means that mandatory standards 
stand a better chance of remaining standard-like (and accordingly deliberation-inducing) as time 
moves forward.  On the other hand, permissive standards may promote richer and more robust 
forms of deliberation, especially over the short term.  With mandatory standards, certain types of 
reasoning are effectively off-limits; courts must take care, for instance, not to rely too much on 
generalizations and presumptions applied across cases, lest their doing so push the operative law 
too far away from the individualized, case-by-case analysis that the mandatory standard requires.   
Recall what happened in Florida v. Harris.  In setting forth the “rigid evidentiary 
checklist” that the Supreme Court rejected, the Florida Supreme Court sought to shed light on a 
set of recurring problems presented by canine searches.  The state court expressed concern, for 
instance, about the absence of a uniform certification standard for drug-sniffing dogs, inadequate 
record-keeping procedures regarding the success rates of their searches, and—to the extent that 
such records existed—defendants’ difficulties in accessing them.109  These deficiencies, the state 
court concluded, not only placed an unfair burden on the defendant in Harris, but would 
continue to place such burdens on similarly-situated defendants in future cases.  By fixing 
attention on these matters, however, the state court could not help but reduce the degree to which 
future applications of the Gates test would permit a “flexible” and “all-things-considered” 
analysis.  The court was, after all, tipping its hand as to the sorts of evidentiary deficiencies it 
would deem to be of central importance in future cases.  And so, subordinate courts in Florida 
received a telling message as to what sorts of sniffs by what sorts of dogs would withstand 
down-the-line constitutional attack.  To be sure, the Florida court need not have gone as far as it 
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did; it could have discussed all of these issues without taking the additional step of adopting 
formal prerequisites for the government to satisfy in every future case.  But even if it had not 
taken that additional step, its focus on a limited category of the attributes of sniff searches was 
designed to channel the reasoning of lower courts in a way that Harris undertook to foreclose. 
To be sure, courts might sometimes deliberate best by focusing narrowly on the case 
before them, resisting the inclination to consider broader regulatory issues that its fact pattern 
might raise.  In Harris, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court might justifiably have worried 
that—in attempting to think generally about problems presented by sniff-search probable cause 
review—the state court would deprive future sniff-search litigants the fact-sensitive attentiveness 
they deserve.  But there’s undoubtedly a deliberation-related cost to the sort of case-by-case, 
totality-of-the-circumstances review that anti-rulification rules require.  When lower courts must 
refrain from looking beyond the individual facts of a case, important aspects of a doctrinal 
problem may escape their notice.  A mandatory standard, in short, may guarantee case-by-case 
deliberation over the long haul, but—by insisting on case-by-case applications of unspecified 
standards—it may guarantee forms of deliberation that are unduly myopic. 
D. Transparency 
A final potential downside to mandatory standards relates to the transparency of lower-
court decisionmaking.  Judges who confront a recurrent fact pattern may come to rely upon 
hidden rules of thumb to govern their implementation of an open-ended legal norm.  (For 
example, if the driver was exceeding 65 mph, a judge might always rule that his driving was 
unreasonable; if the dog was not certified by this or that agency, a judge might always regard its 
alerts as unreliable; etc.).  But if the standard is mandatory, the judge has no reason to reveal—
and indeed, a strong reason not to reveal—the existence of the rules of thumb on which she 
relies.  Put another way, rather than deter lower courts from relying on rules, mandatory 
standards may serve only to push judicial reliance on rules behind closed doors.  And that in turn 
means more confusion and less accountability within the law. 
This last point, to be clear, should not count as a dispositive factor against adopting an 
anti-rulification rule.  Many dubious factors can and probably do influence lower court 
deliberation, even in the face of Supreme Court commands to the contrary.110  That such factors 
carry influence, however, does mean that the Court must resign itself to their existence.  Thus, 
when the Court has concluded that the rule-based implementation of a standard would take the 
doctrine in a bad direction, it should instruct the lower courts not to rulify, even if some lower 
courts might subversively employ hidden rules of thumb.  (After all, not all lower courts will 
ignore the Supreme Court’s direction, and at least a high court declaration of a rule against 
rulification will push against widespread deployment of either open or clandestine rules of 
thumb.)  On the other hand, if the case against rulification is weaker, and/or the lower courts will 
face particularly powerful temptations to rulify, transparency concerns could tip the scale in 
favor of permissive standards.  Under these circumstances, the benefits to be derived from an 
anti-rulification are not likely to outweigh the costs of creating a disconnect between doctrinal 
rhetoric and decisional reality. 
E. Conclusion: Minimalism Redux? 
There is a thematic unity to the various problems I have discussed in this Section.  Each 
of these problems, in one way or another, relates to an overarching concern that anti-rulification 
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rules can close off space that would better be left open for further doctrinal development—such 
rules, in other words, may decide too much too soon.  Considerations related to lower court 
experimentation, the dispersion of decision-making authority, the inducement of deliberation, 
and the promotion of judicial transparency will often favor decisional approaches that, in 
Professor Sunstein’s words, are “catalytic rather than preclusive”—apt to spur more, rather than 
less, investigation, experimentation, and debate regarding the appropriate architecture of judicial 
doctrine.111  But anti-rulification rules often work against such outcomes. 
The anti-minimalist streak of anti-rulification rules raises two final points regarding their 
desirability.  First, given the substantial tension between the priorities of minimalists and the 
effects of anti-rulification rules, I suspect that one’s overall attitude towards minimalism will 
operate as a reasonably reliable proxy for one’s overall attitude towards the project of prohibiting 
down-the-road rulification of Supreme Court standards.  The ardent minimalist should find much 
to fear in rules against rulification, whereas the milquetoast minimalist (and especially the ardent 
maximalist) will not be much moved by the foregoing critiques.  If nothing else, I hope that my 
analysis has made this point clear:  Minimalists in particular ought to view anti-rulification rules 
with a healthy degree of skepticism. 
The second point stems from the first.  Legal commentators have often drawn a quick 
association between minimalist judging and standard-based judging.  As Professor Sunstein 
himself has put it, “[a] preference for minimalism is very close, analytically, to a preference for 
standards over rules.”112  The analysis I have offered here suggests an important qualification to 
this assertion—namely, that minimalist-based judging maps onto standard-based judging only 
insofar as the standards at issue are permissive rather than mandatory.  In other words, a 
minimalist ought view the mere enunciation of a standard for now quite differently from the 
outright imposition of that standard as a lodestar for future cases. The latter sort of decision is, in 
my view, not significantly less maximalist than a decision imposing a first-order rule.  Both of 
these moves are maximalist because they push toward definitive doctrinal solutions for here and 
everafter, rather than provisional solutions, amenable to further tinkering (if not outright 
rethinking) in the lower courts and the Supreme Court itself. 
This observation may seem counterintuitive at first: If plain-vanilla standards promote 
minimalism, should not mandated standards promote it even more effectively?  In fact, however, 
the maximalist nature of anti-rulification rules is easy to reconcile with the basic observation that 
(permissive) standards and minimalism go well together.  Rules against rulification, after all, are 
rules themselves.  And just as substantive, first-order rules foreclose experimentation, 
deliberation, and delegation in the project of defining the proper scope of a legal norm, so too do 
second-order methodological rules (such as rules against rulification) foreclose experimentation, 
deliberation, and delegation in identifying the proper means of applying that norm across cases.  
True, an anti-rulification rule commands the use of standards, and standards themselves are 
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friendly to the minimalist cause.  But standards are friendly to the minimalist cause largely 
because they leave the law open for further elaboration in subsequent cases.  By categorically 
precluding standards from accomplishing that result, rules against rulification end up 
undermining the decisional virtues of minimalism in much the same way that any other set of 
rules might do so. 
IV. WORKING WITH ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES 
The previous Part identified several problems that might arise from the adoption of a rule 
against rulification.  Putting such problems on the table, however, is different from declaring that 
anti-rulification rules should never be used.  And nothing I have said thus far should be taken to 
suggest that courts never ought to issue rules against rulification.  Sometimes the benefits of such 
rules will outweigh their costs: Thus, when the Court determines that an area of law is best 
served by standard-based decisionmaking, rules against rulification help to ensure that future 
decisions will embrace this approach.  Determining when such a decision is appropriate, 
however, is a complicated and context-dependent task.  While I cannot offer a straightforward 
rubric for determining when and when not to implement rules against rulification, I do hope to 
have laid on the table the considerations that should guide the decision.  
But let us now turn to a second set of issues, which involve not the question of whether to 
adopt anti-rulification, but rather how to deal with anti-rulification rules once the decision to 
adopt them has been made. Section A offers some preliminary thoughts on how the Supreme 
Court should go about articulating rules against rulification within its own decisions.  Section B 
then turns to the lower courts’ task of detecting such rules, asking in particular how lower courts 
should interpret mixed signals from the Court about the presence of anti-rulification rules and 
whether the courts may permissibly regard even clearly stated anti-rulification rules as non-
binding dicta. 
A. Creating Anti-Rulification Rules 
1. Separating Substance from Methodology 
 The Court often announces an anti-rulification rule while reviewing a lower court’s effort 
to rulify a standard.  (In Harris, for instance, the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court 
decision that had established, in the Court’s words, a “strict evidentiary checklist” for 
establishing requisite level of reliability for drug-detection dogs.113)  But simply invalidating one 
rulification in particular will not suffice to create a general rule against rulification.  Absent 
further explanation, such a holding would merely establish that the lower court erred by rulifying 
the standard in the way it did.  And such a holding in its nature does not stand for the broader 
proposition that all other attempts at rulifying the standard are similarly invalid.  Standards can 
be rulified in many ways.  Deeming one such rulification inappropriate is not the same as 
prohibiting rulification across the board. 
 Thus, in setting forth a rule against rulification, the Court must take care to disaggregate 
its substantive evaluation of a particular rulification from its methodological evaluation of 
whether a standard may ever be rulified.  This the Court does not always do, as Harris itself 
reveals.  Some portions of the Court’s opinion criticized the Florida Supreme Court for failing to 
evaluate the probable-cause question on a flexible, case-by-case basis.114  Other portions of the 
opinion, however, criticized the substance of the particular evidentiary checklist that the Florida 
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court had devised.115  Logically, these lines of argument point to different conclusions.  If the 
problem with the Florida court’s opinion lay in its rulifying methodology, then the adequacy of 
the checklist should have been irrelevant to the determination and the Court could have reversed 
by relying on Gates without more.  If, by contrast, the problem with the Florida court’s opinion 
stemmed from the substance of the checklist itself, then the Court should have reversed, while 
making clear that other lower courts remained free to experiment with other sorts of evidentiary 
checklists (or alternative rulifications of the Gates standard) in future cases.  Under no 
circumstances, however, should it have followed from the substantive inadequacy of the Florida 
court’s checklist that all future assessments of a dog sniff’s reliability must eschew reliance on 
determinate rules.116 
 There is another point too.  It may well be that the most effective vehicles for establishing 
anti-rulification rules will be cases—unlike Harris—in which the particular rulifications at issue 
do not strike the Court as egregiously off-base.  If the Court really wishes to convince us that a 
given standard should never be rulified, it should focus on the best possible attempts at 
rulification, rather than highlight defects in the obviously misguided ones.  Consider, for 
instance, the Court’s discussion of the Patent Act’s “nonobviousness” requirement in KSR 
International v. Teleflex, Inc.117  There, the Federal Circuit had developed a “teaching, 
suggestions, and motivations” (“TSM”) test for evaluating the obviousness of combination-based 
inventions.  In stark contrast to Harris, where the Court went out of its way to criticize several 
substantive assumptions underlying the lower court’s attempted rulification of the Gates 
standard, the KSR opinion actually endorsed the intuitions underlying the lower court’s TSM 
test.  The test, the Court emphasized, had “captured a helpful insight”; among other things, the it 
reflected the common-sense principle that “it can be important to identify a reason that would 
have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way 
the claimed new invention does.”118  But even helpful insights, the Court went onto explain, 
could not justify the adoption of “rigid and mandatory formulas,” which threatened to reduce the 
obviousness analysis to “a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and 
motivation.”119  Having endorsed the substantive thrust of the test, the Court could more easily 
demonstrate why the “[r]igid preventative rules” that emerged from the test were not good—
why, that is, such rules threatened to “deny factfinders recourse to common sense” in evaluating 
obviousness claims.120  By steering its focus away from the substantive underpinnings of the 
TSM test, and focusing more on the rigidity of the test itself, the Court in KSR International 
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could offer a more focused and persuasive justification for its methodological prohibition on 
rulifying the obviousness standard.121 
2. Practicing What One Preaches 
 A second guiding principle for the creation of anti-rulification rules may seem self-
evident.  Once the Court has prohibited rulification of a standard, it should abide by its own 
proscription.  In this respect, too, the Court’s opinion in Harris fell flat.  Having upbraided the 
Florida Supreme Court for relying on an “evidentiary checklist” to guide its own standards for 
canine reliability review, the Court went on to prescribe what reads much like an evidentiary 
checklist of its own.  Consider some of the guidance the Court offered regarding the proper way 
to conduct a dog-sniffing probable cause inquiry (which, for dramatic effect, I present in quasi-
checklist format): 
• “[T]he decision below treats records of a dog’s field performance as the gold standard 
in evidence, when in most cases they have relatively limited import.”122 
 
• “The better measure of a dog’s reliability thus comes away from the field, in 
controlled testing environments.”123 
 
• “[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training 
program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”124 
 
• “The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has 
recently and successfully completed a training program that evaluated his 
proficiency in locating drugs.”125 
 
• “A defendant, however, must have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a 
dog’s reliability, whether by cross-examining the testifying officer or by 
introducing his own fact or expert witness.”126 
 
•  “If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs 
reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then 
the court should find probable cause.”127 
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In fairness to the Court, none of these prescriptions absolutely requires that future 
assessors of dog reliability accord dispositive weight to one or another type of evidence.128  But 
these and other statements from Harris set forth a surprisingly specific framework for evaluating 
such reliability in future cases, thus complicating lower courts’ ability to apply the probable 
cause standard in the “fluid” and “flexible” manner that Harris seemed to demand.129  Having 
called for the pure application of an unrulified standard to the facts of each case, the Court 
muddied the waters of its own methodological directive, by identifying several general, 
seemingly non-totalistic principles that all such applications must honor.130 
Consider, for instance, the post-Harris plight of a lower court asked to render a reliability 
determination vis-à-vis a dog that has been certified by a newly established and highly reputed 
training agency.  The court might wish to establish, as a general rule, that certification by the 
agency is per se sufficient to establish a dog’s reliability.  Can it so hold?  On the one hand, 
doing so seems consistent with (if not expressly required by) the Harris Court’s suggestion that 
“[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself 
provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”131  On the other hand, such a holding would seem to 
establish the very sort of “bright-line rule” that Harris explicitly eschewed.  In short, the lower 
court faces a Catch-22: It may accord the agency’s certification non-dispositive weight and 
thereby invite reversal on the ground that it undervalued a type of evidence that Harris deemed 
to be critically important.  Or, it may treat the agency’s certification as dispositive and thereby 
invite reversal on the ground that it was “prescrib[ing] . . . an inflexible set of evidentiary 
requirements.”132  Acting one way would ignore Harris’s substantive guidance regarding 
credible evidence of sniff-search reliability; acting the other way would violate its anti-
rulification rule. 
In all likelihood, Harris did not quite mean what it said.  The point of Harris was not that 
lower courts must eschew presumptions and generalizations altogether, but rather that they 
should go no further with these presumptions and generalizations than the Court has told them to 
go.  Harris thus accomplishes a partial rulification of the probable cause inquiry, while also 
suggesting that lower courts should not move that inquiry any farther toward the rule end of the 
spectrum.  There is nothing illogical in such a holding; the Court can cogently instruct its 
subordinates to establish this much ex ante guidance, but not any more.  To the extent that this is 
the true holding of Harris, however, it is a holding at odds with the anti-rulification language that 
permeates the opinion itself.  The true import of the decision would have been easier to discern if 
the Court either had toned down its rhetoric regarding the “fluid” and “common sense” nature of 
probable cause review or had refrained from giving such detailed guidance regarding future 
applications of the probable cause standard.  
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B. Detecting Anti-Rulification Rules  
1. Thresholds of Clarity 
What about the role of lower courts in determining whether they are bound by anti-
rulification rules?  As we saw from Part II, the Supreme Court does not always speak with clarity 
regarding the methodological obligations it wishes to impose on the courts below.  One 
difficulty, as we have seen, is the occasional opinion that blends together substantive and 
methodological critiques: when the Supreme Court attacks a lower court’s rulification of a 
standard, does it intend to wipe out all such rulifications of that standard, or merely the particular 
rulification that the lower court used?  Further difficulties arise when, as in Harris, the Court 
condemns rulification with one hand while engaging in rulification with the other.  And most 
commonly, the Court is often unclear as to whether it is merely defending its own choice to 
adopt a standard or taking the further step of prohibiting rulification of the standard in future 
cases.  In these and other ways, the Supreme Court can generate uncertainty regarding the 
existence of an anti-rulification rule.  And in the face of such uncertainty, the question arises: 
What should lower courts do? 
 Consider, for instance, the law of personal jurisdiction.  When the Court first set forth its 
“minimum contacts” standard for personal jurisdiction analysis, it characterized the inquiry as 
one that could not “be simply mechanical or quantitative,” but rather must “depend . . . upon the 
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws 
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” 133  This language—along with 
other statements from the Court’s personal jurisdiction case law134—has led some lower courts to 
resist adopting rules to facilitate their own application of International Shoe and its progeny.  
These courts, in other words, felt bound not only by the substance of the minimum contacts 
standard, but also by what they saw as the Supreme Court’s methodological preference for 
standards over rules within the context of personal jurisdiction analysis.135  But if you go back 
and peruse the relevant case law, you won’t find the Court ever issuing a direct edict of the sort it 
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issued in the case law I discussed in Part II—insisting, in other words, that lower courts apply 
the minimum contacts standard in a way that proceeds case-by-case and takes into account the 
totality of the circumstances.  Rather, International Shoe’s warnings about mechanistic and 
quantitative decision-making addressed the issue of what sort of substantive inquiry the Court 
itself should adopt for purposes of establishing guiding principles of minimum contacts analysis.  
But what works best for the Court in denoting first-order doctrinal principles of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine may not work best for subordinate courts tasked with translating those 
principles into on-the-ground results.  Put another way, one reason why the Court might wish to 
decline adopting a “mechanical or quantitative” test is precisely because such a test would reduce 
lower courts’ freedom to shape the personal jurisdiction inquiry in whatever manner they see fit.  
So, International Shoe and its progeny could be read as simply offering a justification for the 
Court’s choice of a standard over a rule, rather than an explicit instruction that the standard, once 
adopted, may not be rulified in future cases. 
How should lower courts resolve uncertainties of this sort?  In my view, they should 
apply a strong presumption against anti-rulification rules, agreeing to adhere to such rules only 
when the Court has established them with crystal clarity.  In part, that preference derives from 
the benefits of permissive standard that I have identified in Part III.  Given these benefits, I 
would rather that lower courts—and especially intermediate-level courts of appeals—retain 
freedom to work through difficult doctrinal problems with toolkits that include the power to 
rulify. 
Whatever the intrinsic merits of anti-rulification rules, however, there is an additional 
reason to treat them as non-existent until proven otherwise.  This reason stems from the 
“information-forcing” benefits that such a presumption would produce.136  Simply put, where a 
lower court seeks further guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the existence of an anti-
rulification rule, it is more likely to receive that guidance by assuming for now that no such rule 
exists. 
To see why, suppose that all the lower courts treated an area of case law—for instance, 
the Court’s personal jurisdiction case law—as establishing a rule against rulification.  Going 
forward, the lower courts would apply the minimum contacts standard in a narrow, fact-specific 
manner, issuing opinions that did not venture far beyond the unique circumstances of each case.  
That, in turn, would render the lower courts less likely to produce opinions that attracted the 
Supreme Court’s attention.  They would sometimes err in applying the standard too leniently or 
too strictly, but the consequences of their errors would be relatively minor, owing to the highly 
fact-specific nature of the opinions in which the errors occurred.  If, by contrast, the lower courts 
painted broadly—that is, they issued specific and widely applicable directives regarding the 
application of the minimum contacts test—their decisions would be more likely to arouse the 
interest of the Court itself and thus generate clarifying guidance as to whether a rule against 
rulification does in fact exist. 
2. Dicta Versus Holding? 
 Even if Supreme Court precedent establishes an anti-rulification rule with absolute 
clarity, lower courts might remain tempted to dismiss such a rule as “dicta” rather than 
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“holding.”  The dicta/holding distinction defies easy definition,137 but, in simplified form, it rests 
on the idea that pronouncements of law underpinning the actual result of a case are different 
from pronouncements of law that merely accompany the result.  Only the former sorts of 
propositions, longstanding convention holds, constitute binding authority subject to both 
horizontal and vertical stare decisis.  Extracurricular ponderings about the law—not necessary to 
the outcome of a case—may be treated as persuasive authority, but nothing more. 
 Might anti-rulification rules qualify as non-binding dicta?  Certainly, we can imagine 
cases where the answer is “yes.”  If, say, the Court were to opine on the standard-based nature of 
the eBay four-factor test in a case having nothing to do with a request for injunctive relief, then 
its discussion of eBay would count as non-binding dicta under even the narrowest definitions of 
the term.  But more difficult questions emerge in cases of the sort we examined in Part II, where 
the Court reverses the lower court on the ground that it erroneously relied on a rule to facilitate 
its application of a standard.  Arguably, anti-rulification rules might still qualify as dicta in these 
circumstances, on the theory that only the Court’s objection to the particular rulification at issue 
in the case is necessary to the outcome of that case.  On this understanding, for instance, the 
Court’s analysis in Harris yielded a holding only insofar as it rejected the particular “evidentiary 
checklist” that the Florida Supreme Court employed.  Its broader insistence that no rulifications 
should ever attend sniff-search reliability evaluations was not needed to reach that result: 
whatever the Court’s feelings about alternative lower-court rulifications in other cases, the 
invalidity of the Florida court’s checklist was itself sufficient to doom the decision below.  And 
more generally, the argument goes, globally applicable anti-rulification rules will always count 
as dicta as long as they prove broader than necessary to justify the Court’s invalidation of one 
and only one means of rulifying a standard. 
 This line of reasoning proves too much.  It would suggest that all Supreme Court rules 
(whether or not about rulification) count as dicta rather than holding, since all rules purport to 
decide more than the particular case that accompanies their announcement.  Analogous 
reasoning, for instance, would hold that the prophylactic rule adopted in Miranda was non-
binding dicta, on the theory that a detailed description of how police officers should warn 
suspects in future cases was not necessary to the Court’s holding that the particular warning 
before it violated the law.  But no one treats Miranda’s requirements as dicta; rather, everyone 
treats the Miranda warning as stemming from a binding holding of the case.  And that is true of 
many rules that the Court has adopted; lower courts adhere to the rule, even though the rule 
decides more than the particular case from which it emerged. 
 An alternative attempt to classify anti-rulification rules as dicta might emphasize their 
methodological character.  Stare decisis norms, this argument would go, typically apply to first-
order dictates of law and not to second-order rules about crafting the dictates themselves.  Along 
these lines, as several legislation scholars have noted, lower courts typically do not treat the 
Supreme Court’s preferred methods of statutory interpretation as carrying stare decisis effect.  
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For instance, even if the Supreme Court has eschewed reliance on legislative history when 
interpreting some statute, lower courts may still consult legislative history in interpreting the 
same law.138  And if that is true regarding methods of statutory interpretation, should it not also 
be true regarding the methods of law application as well? 
 This argument, however, conflates two different questions: (1) whether the Court does 
accord stare decisis effect to its methodological rules; and (2) whether the Court may in fact do 
so.  The curiosity regarding methodologies of statutory interpretation arises from the Court’s 
general refusal to enter the precedential fray, not from any sort of widespread understanding that 
the Court would be powerless to create binding rules of interpretive methodology if it so desired.  
In fact, as Professor Abbe Gluck has pointed out, the Court routinely assigns binding 
precedential status to a wide range of methodological rules outside the statutory interpretation 
context, including “Title VII’s burden-shifting regime, the rules of federal contract interpretation, 
federal choice-of-law rules, interpretive regimes for admiralty, and so on.” 139  Moreover, lower 
courts do not bat an eye at the idea that they must treat such rules as binding precedent.  Rules 
against rulification, which the Court characterizes as binding on the courts below, are no 
different.  If common practice is a guide, then—pace the unusual case of statutory 
interpretation—the methodological character of anti-rulification rules is not likely to deprive 
them of binding effect.140 
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 Common practice could be wrong, however.  Perhaps there really is something different about the Court’s 
methodological directives that render them something other than “law” and hence beyond the stare decisis ken.  
That is an interesting question, to be sure, and one on which the burgeoning literature on the precedential status of 
interpretive methodologies has hazarded some preliminary answers.  See, e.g., Scott, supra note ?, at 345 (“The 
common law should be understood to encompass judicial methodology in addition to the traditional substantive 
common law subjects, such as the law of torts.”); Connor, supra note ?, at 684 (noting that “that the purposes behind 
traditional stare decisis suggest that the appropriate reform is to extend the scope of stare decisis to statutory 
interpretation subdecisions”).  For our purposes, however, the law-like nature (or lack thereof) of anti-rulification 
rules probably matters less than the simple fact that the Court purports to make them binding on the courts below.  
That fact, coupled with the equally unremarkable fact that the Court can always reverse lower court judgments that 
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V. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME 
 Rules against rulification represent the primary means by which the Supreme Court 
constrains the method of applying and implementing its precedents in subsequent cases.  Might 
there be other means of imposing such methodological constraints?  I here consider three such 
alternative devices—devices that, to the best of my knowledge, the Court has never explicitly 
employed, but that, like rules against rulification, might restrict (or direct) methodological 
choices in helpful and productive ways.  First, I consider the possibility of “pro-rulification 
rules,” which would expressly instruct the lower courts to rulify standards that the Supreme 
Court itself has settled on.  Second, I consider the possibility of “anti-rulification standards,” 
which discourage but not outright prohibit lower-court rulification.  Finally, I consider the 
possibility of “anti-publication rules,” which would prohibit lower courts from issuing published 
opinions (and hence creating binding precedents) in connection with a particular standard the 
Court has created.  
A. Pro-Rulification Rules 
 In Part III, we saw that there exist a variety of reasons why the Court might wish not to 
create a rule against rulification.  One such reason relates to the value of lower court 
experimentation; in particular, when the Court envisions that it might one day offer specific 
guidance regarding the application of a legal norm, but is not yet sure as to what that guidance 
will be, the best course of action might be to issue a permissive standard for now and to see what 
the lower courts come up with.  Under these circumstances, an anti-rulification rule would prove 
counterproductive, on the theory that prohibiting lower court rulification would defeat the 
purpose of adopting the standard itself. 
 If the Court really wished to examine the fruits of lower court rulification processes 
before settling on its own rule-like formulation of a standard, perhaps it should do more than 
simply not prohibit lower courts from rulifying.  Maybe, that is, the court should affirmatively 
require lower courts to do just that. 
 For a rough analogue to this idea, consider the Court’s discussion of Article III standing 
doctrine in Allen v. Wright.141  There, in discussing the “injury-in-fact” requirement, the Court 
conceded that the requirement “cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional 
standing requirement a mechanical exercise.”142  At the same time, however, the Court went on 
to note that “[t]he absence of precise definitions . . . hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the 
law of standing.”143  Why?  Because Article III standing “is built on a single basic idea—the idea 
of separation of powers” and “both federal and state courts have long experience in applying and 
elaborating in numerous contexts the pervasive and fundamental notion of separation of 
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powers.”144  Put somewhat differently, subsequent clarification of the doctrine might occur in the 
lower courts themselves, since “[d]etermining standing in a particular case may be facilitated by 
clarifying principles or even clear rules developed in prior cases.”145  This was, to be sure, not 
always going to be possible; many issues of Article III standing would always require “careful 
judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations.”146  But, given the overarching separation-of-
powers principles at play, and given the lower courts’ ability to flesh out the contours of these 
principles through the common law method, the Court saw an opportunity for “the gradual 
clarification of the law through judicial application.”147 
 To be sure, this language hardly obligated lower courts to start developing clarifying 
rules regarding the scope of the injury-in-fact requirement.  Perhaps the Court intended merely to 
assuage fears that a vaguely formulated injury-in-fact requirement presaged eternal doctrinal 
confusion.  But one at least sees within the passage the seeds for what might be a new, and 
sometimes useful technique for developing the contours of the law in an especially inclusive and 
dialogic way: create a standard at the Supreme Court level and then expressly invite (if not 
outright obligate) the lower courts to develop rules about the standard in subsequent cases.  
Insofar as greater clarity and specificity of the doctrine are the overarching desiderata, and 
insofar as the Court seeks lower court input on how the doctrine should be clarified and 
specified, then a “pro-rulification rule” might best serve the interests of the Court itself. 
B. Anti-Rulification Standards 
Anti-rulification rules, I have argued, can suffer on account of their rule-like nature.  
They categorically render rulification off-limits, leaving minimal room for future discretion in 
determining whether the process should take place.  When the absolutism of an anti-rulification 
threatens to do harm, one possible corrective is to reduce its absoluteness.  Rather than prohibit 
rulification outright, the Court might simply issue a non-categorical caution against rulifying, 
while still permitting the practice to proceed when exceptional circumstances so warrant. 
I would term such a directive a “standard against rulification.”  One can imagine various 
forms that such a standard would assume.  The Court might hold, for instance, that lower courts 
may not rulify unless doing so is “absolutely necessary to constrain trial court decisionmaking.” 
Or, it might provide that lower courts may rulify, but only in a way that “maintains an adequate 
degree of fit between the purpose of the norm and the outcomes that it generates.”  And so forth.  
The idea, in short, would be to place a thumb on the scale against rulification without banning 
the practice outright. 
Again, I am unaware of any holdings that follow directly along these lines.148  In practice, 
though, a standard against rulification might not operate all that differently from Supreme Court 
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 Perhaps one could identify such an anti-rulification standard as implicit in the recent Fourth Amendment case of 
City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).  There, in declining to adopt a “broad holding concerning 
employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment,” the Court pointed to “rapid 
changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission” and uncertain predictions as to “how 
workplace norms . . . will evolve.” Id. at 2630; see also id. (“It is preferable to dispose of this case on narrower 
grounds.”). Although never explicitly prohibiting courts from rulifying the standard it embraced, the Court’s 
emphasis on evolving technologies and social norms might be read as strongly cautioning them against such an 
approach.  I thank Bill Corbett for pointing this out to me. 
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doctrines that leave the existence of an anti-rulification rule unclear.149  And these sorts of 
doctrines, as we saw in the previous Part, do indeed exist.  In these areas of doctrine, recall, 
uncertainty arises not from a deliberate choice on the part of the Court to vest some measure of 
rulification discretion in the courts below.  Rather, the issue is whether, in justifying its own 
decision to adopt a rule over a standard, the Court has (intentionally or not) directed its 
subordinates to follow suit when applying that standard to future cases.  This difference aside, 
however, the upshot of both sorts of decisions is the same.  When the Court sends mixed signals 
about the existence of anti-rulification rule, lower courts may feel some, but not total, pressure to 
avoid rulifying the standard, much as they would do in the face of an express directive from the 
Court instructing them, say, to avoid rulifying unless absolutely necessary. 
As compared to a debatably existent rule against rulification, however, a standard against 
rulification is more likely to yield manageable and satisfactory forms of lower court discretion.  
For one thing, if a lower court determines that uncertain precedents do in fact create an anti-
rulification rule, then, within that court’s jurisdiction at least, rulifying discretion totally and 
completely disappears.  With an anti-rulification standard, by contrast, all intermediate courts 
may proceed with the knowledge that rulification might be appropriate under some 
circumstances.  In addition, standards against rulification better enable the Court to identify the 
conditions under which rulification may take place.  If the only source of lower court discretion 
is doctrinal confusion regarding the presence of an anti-rulification rule, then the lower courts 
may leverage that confusion to steer their case law in unanticipated and undesirable directions.  
If, by contrast, the source of lower court discretion is a direct vesting of such discretion by the 
Court itself, then the Court can more effectively channel that discretion in the direction it wants 
it to go. 
C. Anti-Publication Rules 
Thus far, we have explored alternatives to anti-rulification rules that are friendlier to the 
development of rule-based doctrines in the lower courts.  Here, by contrast, I consider a final 
possibility that, in my view, would deter rulification even more effectively than anti-rulification 
rules themselves.  As we have previously seen,150 even with anti-rulification rules in place, the 
accretion of precedents over time will tend to increase the specificity of legal doctrine.  Anti-
rulification rules slow down this process, but at the end of the day, even the most categorical 
rules against rulification cannot stop rulification from occurring at all.  Today’s decisions 
become tomorrow’s precedents.  And with enough precedents on the books, application of even 
mandatory standards will be far more constrained and far less holistic than the Court might wish 
for it to be. 
Would the Court be able to stave off even these very gradual processes of rulification that 
anti-rulification rules are powerless to stop?  In theory, yes.  If gradual rulification inevitably 
results from precedential decision-making, the Court could nip it in the bud by prohibiting 
precedential opinions.  Most federal courts of appeals regularly issue unpublished opinions, 
which carry minimal, if any, precedential weight.  This practice is highly controversial: among 
other things, nonprecedential opinions (called summary orders in some circuits) have been 
criticized as unconstitutional,151 unwise,152 and unfair to the parties they bind.153  But whatever 
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their flaws, unpublished opinions do provide a means of resolving cases in the present without 
constraining the resolution of cases in the future.154  And thus, if the Court were really serious 
about guaranteeing that each case arising under a standard enjoys case-by-case, holistic, and 
common-sensical review, then prohibiting the publication of opinions in these cases would prove 
an especially potent means of achieving that result. 
Many readers, I suspect, would blanch at this proposal.  Wholly apart from its potential 
illegality, the promulgation of anti-publication rules would seem an especially meddlesome and 
heavy-handed move for the Court to make.  Why should the lower courts be told how to handle 
their own business?  Can’t they figure out for themselves whether or not to issue a precedential 
opinion in a given case?  Or, put somewhat differently, wouldn’t anti-publication rules severely 
impair lower courts’ abilities to develop and elaborate on Supreme Court precedents in useful 
and beneficial ways?   
You can probably see where I am going with this.  If rules against publication strike you 
as absurd, then rules against rulification ought at least to strike you as problematic.   Anti-
publication rules, after all, would amount to nothing more than anti-rulification rules in a super-
strong form.  Whereas anti-rulification rules limit a lower court’s power to make law for itself, 
anti-publication rules would totally destroy it.  Thus, many of our objections to rules against 
publication would apply to rules against rulification as well, albeit in somewhat muted form.  
The judicial system derives value from letting lower courts make law about what Supreme Court 
standards entail.  And for the same reasons that anti-publication rules would eliminate that value, 
anti-rulification rules would substantially reduce it. 
CONCLUSION 
 Any system of adjudication must reconcile two basic tasks.  The first is resolving 
individual cases, the second is the task of shaping and enunciating controlling norms of law.  
These two tasks, as many commentators have noted, rest in uneasy repose.  Efforts to ensure the 
fair and just resolution of cases often come at the expense of promoting the sound development 
of the law, and vice versa.  What is good for the parties to a particular dispute may be bad for the 
doctrine writ large; what is good for the doctrine writ large may be bad for the parties to a 
particular dispute.   Many classic disputes over the judge’s role boil down to this basic tradeoff: 
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To what extent should courts act as the mere resolvers of disputes, and to what extent should 
they act as active shapers of the law?155 
  The questions examined in this Article implicate this tension between the dispute-
resolution and law-formulation models of judicial work.  Those who emphasize the dispute 
resolution model should find much to like in anti-rulification rules, which help to ensure 
comprehensive, holistic, and commonsensical judicial deliberation about each case that makes its 
way through the legal system.  Those who favor the law declaration model, meanwhile, should 
find much to dislike in anti-rulification rules, whose very attempts to realize fairness at the retail 
level may frustrate courts’ efforts to develop workable and effective doctrine at the wholesale 
level.  And that is so, we have seen, because prohibiting the rulification of standards means 
inhibiting beneficial forms of thinking about and tinkering with the substance of the law itself. 
Additional complexities, to be sure, might underlie this basic proposition.  But the parallels 
nonetheless strike me as important and real.  Simply put, mandatory standards reflect the values 
of the dispute-resolver, whereas permissive standards reflect the values of the law-declarer. 
 The irony remains, though, that rules against rulification are rules—reflecting, in other 
words, the law-declarer’s command that dispute-resolution matters most.  That may seem 
inherently contradictory, though it need not be so.  If one believes that only the Supreme Court 
should function as the exclusive developer of law within the judicial system, then it makes 
perfect sense for the Court to exert its law-developing authority in a manner that ensures fair and 
faithful dispute resolution in the courts below.  But insofar as one rejects this vision of the 
federal judiciary—as I do—then rules against rulification are not so easily justified.  That is not 
to say they have no place in a judicial system in which all courts have some say over the scope 
and substance of legal norms.  But if the vision of our system is a collaborative one, in which the 
Supreme Court leads but does not go it alone in developing the law, then the Court should at 
least take care to promulgate its rules against rulification with due attention to the law-
declaration downsides that they bring. 
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